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ARTICLE 
CARTELS BY ANOTHER NAME: 
SHOULD LICENSED OCCUPATIONS FACE 
ANTITRUST SCRUTINY? 
AARON EDLIN† & REBECCA HAW†† 
It has been over a hundred years since George Bernard Shaw wrote that 
“[a]ll professions are a conspiracy against the laity.” Since then, the number of 
occupations and the percentage of workers subject to occupational licensing have 
exploded; nearly one-third of the U.S. workforce is now licensed, up from five 
percent in the 1950s. Through occupational licensing boards, states endow 
cosmetologists, veterinary doctors, medical doctors, and florists with the authority to 
decide who may practice their art. It cannot surprise when licensing boards 
comprised of competitors regulate in ways designed to raise their profits. The result 
for consumers is higher prices and less choice, as licensing raises wages by eighteen 
percent and bars competition from unlicensed workers. For African-style hair 
braiders, the result is either an illicit business or thousands of hours of irrelevant 
training imposed by a cosmetology board. For lawyers, the result is less competition 
from tax accountants, paralegals, and out-of-state lawyers.  
The Sherman Act’s great accomplishment has been to make cartels per se 
illegal and relatively scarce—unless the cartel is managed by a professional licensing 
board. Most jurisdictions consider such boards, as state creations, exempt from 
antitrust scrutiny by the state action doctrine, leaving would-be competitors and 
consumers no recourse against their cartel-like activity.  
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We contend that the state action doctrine should not prevent antitrust suits 
against state licensing boards that are comprised of private competitors deputized to 
regulate and to outright exclude their own competition, often with the threat of 
criminal sanction. At most, state action should immunize licensing boards from the 
per se rule and require plaintiffs to prove their cases under the rule of reason. We 
argue that the Fourth Circuit’s recent decision, soon to be reviewed by the Supreme 
Court, to uphold a Federal Trade Commission (FTC) antitrust suit against a 
licensing board—denying state action immunity to a licensing board and thereby 
creating a circuit split—was a step in the right direction but did not go far enough. 
The Supreme Court should take the split as an opportunity to clarify that when 
competitors hold the reins to their own competition, they must answer to Senator 
Sherman. 
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“All professions are conspiracies against the laity.” 
George Bernard Shaw  
The Doctor’s Dilemma (1906) 
INTRODUCTION 
The Sherman Act has had one principal success: cartels and their smoke-
filled rooms, where competitors agree to waste economic resources for their 
own industry’s benefit, are unambiguously and uncontroversially illegal in 
the United States1—unless that industry is a profession and that cartel is a 
state licensing board. Although often overlooked, licensing boards have 
become a massive exception to the Act’s ban on cartels.  
Licensing boards are largely dominated by active members of their 
respective industries who meet to agree on ways to limit the entry of new 
 
1 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012) (“Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or 
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is 
declared to be illegal.”). The loud and lively debate about the Sherman Act’s reach beyond this 
uncontroversial core tends to obscure this simple yet powerful success of § 1. 
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competitors.2 Some boards use their power to limit price competition or 
restrict the quantity of services available.3 But professional boards, unlike 
cartels in commodities or consumer products, are sanctioned by the state—
even considered part of the state4—and so are often assumed to operate 
outside the reach of the Sherman Act under a line of Supreme Court cases 
starting with Parker v. Brown.5  
When only about five percent of American workers were subject to licensing 
requirements during the 1950s,6 the anticompetitive effect of these state-
sanctioned cartels was relatively small. Now, however, nearly a third of 
American workers need a state license to perform their job legally, and this 
trend toward licensing is continuing.7 The service sector—the most likely to 
be covered by licensing—has grown enormously, with its share of nonfarm 
employment growing from roughly 40% in 1950 to over 60% in 2007.8 Some 
recent additions to the list of professions requiring licenses include lock-
smiths, 9  beekeepers, 10  auctioneers, 11  interior designers, 12  fortune tellers, 13 
tour guides,14 and shampooers.15  
Many boards have abused their power to insulate incumbents from com-
petition. Cosmetologists, for example, are required, on average, to have ten 
 
2 See Morris M. Kleiner, Occupational Licensing, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 189, 191 (2000) (defining 
occupational licensing and explaining the composition of state licensing boards); see also infra text 
accompanying notes 49-50 and Appendix. 
3 See MORRIS M. KLEINER, LICENSING OCCUPATIONS: ENSURING QUALITY OR RE-
STRICTING COMPETITION? 65-96 (2006) (discussing occupational regulations’ ability to restrict 
supply and the implications of practitioner earnings). 
4 See Benson v. Ariz. St. Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 673 F.2d 272, 275 (9th Cir. 1982) (explaining 
that the Board of Dental Examiners is “a state agency” due to state statutes that, among other 
things, “establish the Board”). 
5 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943) (“The Sherman Act makes no mention of the state as such, and 
gives no hint that it was intended to restrain state action or official action directed by a state.”). 
6 KLEINER, supra note 3, at 1. 
7 See Morris M. Kleiner & Alan B. Krueger, Analyzing the Extent and Influence of Occupational 
Licensing on the Labor Market, 31 J. LAB. ECON. S173, S198 (2013) (estimating that, as of 2008, 29% 
of U.S. workers were licensed and noting that licensing is a growing phenomenon in the U.S. 
economy). 
8 See Marlene A. Lee & Mark Mather, U.S. Labor Force Trends, POPULATION BULL., June 
2008, at 3, 7, available at http://www.prb.org/pdf08/63.2uslabor.pdf. 
9 Stephanie Simon, A License to Shampoo: Jobs Needing State Approval Rise, WALL ST. J., Feb. 
7, 2011, at A1. 
10 Walter Gellhorn, The Abuse of Occupational Licensing, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 6, 6 (1976). 
11 Dick Carpenter & Lisa Knepper, Op-Ed., Do Barbers Really Need a License?, WALL ST. J., 
May 11, 2012, at A13 
12 Clark Neily, Op-Ed., Watch Out for that Pillow, WALL ST. J., Apr. 1, 2008, at A17. 
13 Emily Sweeney, Town Rebuffs Fortune-Teller, Citing Residency Law, BOS. GLOBE, May 9, 
2004, at W1. 
14 J. Freedom du Lac, Regulating the Right to Talk to Customers?, WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 2010, at B1. 
15 Simon, supra note 9. 
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times as many days of training as Emergency Medical Technicians (EMT) 
must have. 16  In Alabama, unlicensed practice of interior design was a 
criminal offense until 2007.17 In Oklahoma, one must take a year of course-
work on funeral service (including embalming and grief counseling) just to 
sell a casket, while burial without a casket at all is perfectly legal.18 Even 
traditionally licensed occupations, the so-called learned professions, use 
licensing restrictions to repress competition. For example, all states impose 
some restrictions on lawyer advertising, and some even prevent truthful 
claims about low prices.19 In many states, dentists cannot legally employ 
more than two hygienists each, a restriction that raises demand for den-
tists.20 And in some states, nurse practitioners must be supervised by a 
physician,21 even though studies show that nurse practitioners and physicians 
provide equivalent quality of care where their practices overlap.22 
 
16 See DICK M. CARPENTER II ET AL., INST. FOR JUSTICE, LICENSE TO WORK: A NATIONAL 
STUDY OF BURDENS FROM OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING 29 (2012) [hereinafter LICENSE TO 
WORK], available at http://www.ij.org/images/pdf_folder/economic_liberty/occupational_licensing/ 
licensetowork.pdf (reporting that states require an average of 33 days of training for EMTs, but 372 
days for cosmetologists). Arkansas, for instance, requires 28 days of training for EMTs and 350 days 
for cosmetologists. Id. at 42-43. 
17 Neily, supra note 12. 
18 See Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1211-13 (10th Cir. 2004) (outlining the regulatory 
scheme for the funeral industry in Oklahoma). 
19 See LEXISNEXIS, 50 STATE SURVEYS OF STATUTES & REGULATIONS: ATTORNEY 
ADVERTISING (Mar. 2013) (“Every state regulates the advertising of its attorneys.”); see also 
OHIO RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.1 cmt. 4 (2012) (“Characterization of rates or fees 
chargeable by the lawyer or law firm such as ‘cut rate,’ ‘lowest,’ ‘giveaway,’ ‘below cost,’ ‘discount,’ 
or ‘special’ is misleading.”). 
20 See J. NELLIE LIANG & JONATHAN D. OGUR, BUREAU OF ECON. STAFF REP. TO 
THE F.T.C., RESTRICTIONS ON DENTAL AUXILIARIES: AN ECONOMIC POLICY ANALYSIS 6 
& n.6 (1987), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/restrictions-
dental-auxiliaries/232032.pdf (noting that restrictions generally allow dentists to employ between 
one and three hygienists). 
21 See SHARON CHRISTIAN & CATHERINE DOWER, CAL. HEALTHCARE FOUND., 
SCOPE OF PRACTICE LAWS IN HEALTH CARE: RETHINKING THE ROLE OF NURSE 
PRACTITIONERS 3 (2008), available at http://www.chcf.org/~/media/MEDIA%20LIBRARY% 
20Files/PDF/S/PDF%20ScopeOfPracticeLawsNursePractitionersIB.pdf (noting that thirty states 
require at least some degree of physician supervision or collaboration); Tracy A. Klein, Scope of 
Practice and the Nurse Practitioner: Independent, Collaboration, Supervision: How Is Your Scope 
Regulated?, MEDSCAPE, http://www.medscape.org/viewarticle/506277_5 (last updated Oct. 19, 
2007) (“[Twenty-three] states require no physician involvement for the licensed [Nurse Practitioner] 
to diagnose and treat, while the remainder of states require some degree of written or formal 
physician involvement in [Nurse Practitioner] practice.”). 
22 CHRISTIAN & DOWER, supra note 21, at 6 (listing multiple studies finding no material 
difference in quality of care); Morris M. Kleiner et al., Relaxing Occupational Licensing Require-
ments: Analyzing Wages and Prices for a Medical Service (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 19906, 2014), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w19906. 
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Labor economists have shown that the net effect of licensing on quality 
is equivocal.23 What is not equivocal, according to their empirical studies, is 
the effect of licensing on consumer prices. Morris Kleiner, the leading 
economist studying the effects of licensing on price and quality of service, 
estimates that licensing costs consumers $116 to $139 billon every year.24 
And consumers are not the only potential losers, since more licensing means 
fewer jobs.25 All this said, we do not claim that all licensing rules are 
harmful. Some no doubt improve service quality and public safety enough 
to justify the costs. Our point is that many do not. 
Thanks in part to a spate of stories in mainstream news outlets like The 
New York Times,26 The Wall Street Journal,27 NPR,28 and even The Daily 
Show,29 politicians are taking notice of the growing problem with licensing. 
In early 2013, Massachusetts Governor Deval Patrick announced a set of 
“common-sense changes in the Division of Professional Licensure” designed 
to improve the business climate in the state.30  Governor Patrick only 
proposed modest changes,31 perhaps because an attempt at more dramatic 
licensing reform by Florida Governor Rick Scott failed in 2011.32 The White 
 
23 See CAROLYN COX & SUSAN FOSTER, BUREAU OF ECON., FTC, THE COSTS AND BENE-
FITS OF OCCUPATIONAL REGULATION 21-27, 40 (1990), available at http://www.ramblemuse.com/ 
articles/cox_foster.pdf (“The empirical findings indicate that mandatory entry requirements of 
licensing cannot necessarily be relied upon to raise the quality of service or decrease the overpre-
scription of treatment.”). 
24 KLEINER, supra note 3, at 115. 
25 See Kleiner & Krueger, supra note 7, at S178 (noting studies that have found that licensing 
restricts the supply of workers). 
26 See Jacob Goldstein, So You Think You Can Be a Hair Braider..., N.Y. TIMES MAG., June 17, 
2012, at 20 (discussing the burdens of licensing requirements on certain low- to moderate-income 
occupations). 
27 See Simon, supra note 9 (citing the efforts of cat groomers, tattoo artists, tree trimmers, 
and other specialists to increase regulations in their fields). 
28 Why It’s Illegal to Braid Hair Without a License, NPR ( June 12, 2012), http://www.npr.org/ 
blogs/money/2012/06/21/154826233/why-its-illegal-to-braid-without-a-license (telling the story of 
one Utah woman who was forced to abandon her business). 
29  The Braidy Bill, DAILY SHOW WITH JON STEWART ( June 3, 2004), http:// 
www.thedailyshow.com/watch/thu-june-3-2004/the-braidy-bill (parodying the potential harm from 
“illegal braiders”). 
30 Press Release, Massachusetts Office of the Governor, Governor Patrick Builds on Regula-
tory Reform Successes; Files Legislation to Improve Business Climate for Licensed Professionals 
( Jan. 7, 2013), http://www.mass.gov/governor/pressoffice/pressreleases/2013/0107-regulatory-reform.html. 
31 Governor Patrick proposed merging the electrology and barbering boards and eliminating 
the Board of Radio and Television Technicians. Id. 
32 See Chip Mellor & Dick Carpenter, Op-Ed., Want Jobs? Cut Local Regulations, WALL 
ST. J., July 28, 2011, at A15 (criticizing the Florida legislature for rejecting Governor Scott’s 
proposal to deregulate twenty occupations). Michigan Governor Rick Snyder has made similar 
proposals. See Carpenter & Knepper, supra note 11 (referencing Governor Snyder’s April 2012 
proposal to abolish eighteen occupational licenses and eliminate nine licensing boards).  
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House has also taken a stand against excessive licensing. In 2011, President 
Obama named Alan Krueger, a labor economist whose empirical work 
highlights some of the anticompetitive effects of licensing, as Chair of the 
President’s Council of Economic Advisers. 33  Krueger has written that 
licensing has gone too far and become a way to restrict labor supply.34 First 
Lady Michelle Obama has successfully lobbied twenty-two states to approve 
legislation that recognizes out-of-state licenses held by military spouses as a 
part of her “Joining Forces” initiative.35 Even Congress has started to pay 
attention. In 2010, Congress commissioned a report on the effect of 
healthcare worker licensing on the affordability of care; the report advised 
streamlining license requirements and allowing for interstate reciprocity.36 
Despite wide recognition of the potential for economic harm associated 
with allowing professions to control their licensing rules and define the 
scope of their art, real reform is elusive. Part of the reason is that, in the 
professional licensing context, the most powerful legal tool against anticom-
petitive activity appears unavailable. Most jurisdictions interpret antitrust 
federalism to shield licensing boards from the Sherman Act despite the fact 
that the boards often look and act like § 1’s principal target. Other avenues 
for reform, including constitutional suits asserting the rights of would-be 
professionals, have done little to slow or reverse the trend toward cartelized 
labor markets. 
Last year, in North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC,37 the 
Fourth Circuit upheld an FTC decision finding a state licensing board 
liable for Sherman Act abuses, becoming the only appellate court to expose 
a licensing board to antitrust scrutiny and thereby creating a circuit split. 
The case is a step in the right direction, but it does not go far enough 
because the court could be seen as relying on the method of appointment to 
 
33 See Press Release, White House, Remarks by the President in Announcing his Nomination 
of Alan Krueger for Chair of CEA (Aug. 29, 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2011/08/29/remarks-president-announcing-his-nomination-alan-krueger-chair-cea.  
34 See, e.g., Alan B. Krueger, Do You Need a License to Earn a Living? You Might Be Surprised at 
the Answer, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/02/business/yourmoney/ 
02scene.html. 
35 See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, MILITARY SKILLS FOR AMERICA’S FU-
TURE: LEVERAGING MILITARY SERVICE AND EXPERIENCE TO PUT VETERANS AND 
MILITARY SPOUSES BACK TO WORK 20-21 (2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
sites/default/files/docs/veterans_report_5-31-2012.pdf (detailing the scope of the problem and the 
White House’s response). 
36 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HEALTH LICENSING BOARD REPORT TO 
CONGRESS 31 (2010), available at http://www.hrsa.gov/ruralhealth/about/telehealth/licenserpt10.pdf. 
37 717 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2013). 
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the board—not just on the identity of its members as competitors.38 The 
Supreme Court has now granted certiorari; we urge the Court to take this 
opportunity to hold boards composed of competitors to the strictest version 
of its test for state action immunity, regardless of how the board’s members 
are appointed. In particular, the Court should make clear that, just like the 
wine producers in Midcal, competitor-dominated boards that regulate their 
own competition and the entry of competitors will be treated as private 
actors and subject to antitrust review unless their acts are both (1) pursuant 
to the state’s clearly articulated purpose to displace competition and (2) 
subject to active state supervision.39 Where a board fails either prong of this 
test, courts should subject the board’s actions to antitrust scrutiny under a 
modified rule of reason. 
Our proposal recognizes the potential benefits of licensing—preventing 
charlatanism and injury to the public—but rejects the idea that the potential 
benefits justify total antitrust immunity for licensing. We advocate for an 
approach that uses the potential benefits to influence how restrictions will 
be reviewed, not whether they will be reviewed at all. Although our proposal 
involves a shift in the dominant interpretation of state action doctrine, it 
does not require any change in Supreme Court precedent, and the Supreme 
 
38 The majority in North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners agreed with the FTC that 
“state agencies ‘in which a decisive coalition (usually a majority) is made up of participants in the 
regulated market,’ who are chosen by and accountable to their fellow market participants, are 
private actors and must meet both Midcal prongs.” Id. at 368. The majority did not explicitly 
decide whether a board should be treated as private actors if a “decisive coalition . . . is made up of 
participants in the regulated market” but chosen by the governor, for example, as is true of the vast 
majority of boards we survey in our Appendix. And, in fact, elsewhere in the opinion, the majority 
leaves out the method of appointment. Id. at 375. (“At the end of the day, this case is about a state 
board run by private actors in the marketplace taking action outside of the procedures mandated 
by state law . . . .”). Judge Barbara Keenan, in contrast, makes clear in her concurrence that, as 
she understands the court’s decision, the selfish financial interest of the board members as market 
participants would not alone make them private actors subject to antitrust review; instead, 
according to the concurrence, the court’s holding “turn[ed] on the fact that the members of the 
Board, who are market participants, are elected by other private participants.” Id. at 376 (Keenan, 
J., concurring).  
Our reading, however, is that the majority was careful not to decide a case that was not before 
them, such as a case in which a financially interested board is appointed by a governor, rather than 
elected by other financially interested market participants. If the majority had decided that the 
dental board’s method of appointment were critical, the majority could have been explicit about 
that and thus eliminated the need for a concurrence. The best reading is that the majority simply 
did not decide this important question because it did not need to in the case before the court. That 
said, under the Fourth Circuit’s opinion in North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners, there is 
ample room for boards to argue that they are not private actors so long as they are appointed by 
the state without any election.  
39 Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980) (ex-
plaining the two standards—namely, state articulation and supervision—for antitrust immunity). 
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Court’s unanimous opinion last term in FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health System, 
Inc. demonstrated its appetite for stopping cartel-like abuses of antitrust 
immunity.40 The time is right to take action. 
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I details the expansion of licensing 
in the United States and gives examples of its excesses. Part II explains how 
the current crisis arose, first summarizing the economics of licensing and 
then surveying the legal landscape that allowed its relatively unfettered 
expansion. Part III makes our normative case for imposing Sherman Act 
liability on state licensing boards, arguing that there is a logical fit between 
antitrust policy and the economic harm of heavy-handed licensing require-
ments. We also address antitrust federalism, claiming that deference to state 
decisionmaking is especially difficult to justify in the context of occupational 
licensing. Part IV details the mechanics of the alternative system we pro-
pose. We suggest that in the licensing context, the rule of reason should be 
modified to allow defendants to justify their restraint with the argument 
that less competition (of certain kinds) benefits consumers in the regulated 
labor market because it will improve public safety and the quality of service 
provided, an argument that is traditionally out of bounds in § 1 cases. Part 
 
40 133 S. Ct. 1003 (2013). In Phoebe Putney, a local government entity (the Hospital Authority 
of Albany-Dougherty County) purchased a hospital, changing the local market from one with two 
competing hospitals to one with a single monopolistic provider of acute-care hospital services. The 
purchase was possible because the state of Georgia had granted the Hospital Authority a variety of 
powers, including the power to buy hospitals. Because Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire 
previously held that sub-state governmental entities do not require supervision to trigger antitrust 
immunity, 471 U.S. 34, 43 (1985), the question in Phoebe Putney was whether the state had clearly 
articulated a policy of displacing competition through an anticompetitive merger when it granted 
the Hospital Authority the power to buy hospitals. 133 S. Ct. at 1009. The Court held that the 
state had not done so, reasoning that although the Authority was entrusted with providing medical 
care and acquiring the means to provide medical care (which may involve purchasing hospitals), 
those powers can be exercised without raising competitive issues. Id. at 1012. Therefore, the grant 
of those powers did not implicitly and necessarily contemplate anticompetitive use. Id. at 1014. 
The Court also emphasized that state action exemptions should be disfavored, quoting its prior 
language from FTC v. Ticor Title Insurance Co., to this effect. Id. at 1010 (“[S]tate-action immunity 
is disfavored, much as are repeals by implication.” (quoting FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 
621, 636 (1992))). 
To the extent that licensing board cases are about supervision, which is our focus here, Phoebe 
Putney’s relevance to state action immunity for licensing boards is indirect. The case mainly 
demonstrates an appetite for narrow readings of the state action doctrine and a reiteration of 
Ticor’s language that state action immunities are disfavored. We argue, however, that the FTC’s 
success in arguing that the “clear articulation” prong was not met would be much more difficult in 
the context of professional licensing. Unlike the authority to purchase hospitals, the state-granted 
ability to restrict professional entry and practice will almost always have an anticompetitive effect. 
Thus, we do not see Phoebe Putney as widening the path for challenges to licensing board 
immunity. Rather, the battleground in the case of occupational boards remains the supervision 
prong under Midcal. Still, Phoebe Putney is in the spirit of narrowing state action immunity and 
reiterates that state action immunity is disfavored. In that sense, it accords with our thesis. 
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IV then discusses the parties, damages, and defenses that would be involved 
in a licensing board suit and speculates about likely state responses to the 
new system. 
I. OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING BOARDS: THE NEW CARTELS 
Once limited to a few learned professions, licensing is now required for 
over 800 occupations.41 And once limited to minimum educational require-
ments and entry exams, licensing board restrictions are now a vast, complex 
web of anticompetitive rules and regulations. The explosion of licensing and 
the tangle of restrictions it has created should worry anyone who believes 
that fair competition is essential to national economic health. 
A. The Scope of Professional Licensing: Big and Getting Bigger 
State-level occupational licensing is on the rise. In fact, it has eclipsed 
unionization as the dominant organizing force of the U.S. labor market. 
While unions once claimed 30% of the country’s working population, that 
figure has since shrunk to below 15%.42 Over the same period of time, the 
number of workers subject to state-level licensing requirements has doubled; 
today, 29% of the U.S. workforce is licensed and 6% is certified by the 
government.43 The trend has important ramifications. Conservative esti-
mates suggest that licensing raises consumer prices by 15%.44 There is also 
evidence that professional licensing increases the wealth gap; it tends to 
raise the wages of those already in high-income occupations45 while harming 
low-income consumers who cannot afford the inflated prices. 
The expansion of occupational licensing has at least two causes. First, as 
the U.S. economy shifted away from manufacturing and toward service 
industries, the number of workers in licensed professions swelled, accounting 
for a greater proportion of the workforce. Second, the number of licensed 
 
41 KLEINER, supra note 3, at 5. 
42 Kleiner, supra note 2, at 190. 
43 Kleiner & Krueger, supra note 7, at S176, S177 fig.1, S182. 
44 Id. at S179 (“[E]stimates of . . . state licensing’s influence on wages with standard labor 
market controls show a range from 10% to 15% for higher wages associated with occupational 
licensing.”). 
45 See Kleiner, supra note 2, at 194-96 (calculating the extent to which licensing affects wages); 
see also Timothy R. Muzondo & Bohumir Pazderka, Occupational Licensing and Professional Incomes 
in Canada, 13 CAN. J. ECON. 659, 666 (1980) (performing a regression analysis and finding that 
licensing restrictions confer benefits to employees in educated professions); Robert J. Thornton & 
Andrew R. Weintraub, Licensing in the Barbering Profession, 32 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 242, 248 
(1979) (finding that minimum education requirements may “exclud[e] significant numbers from 
entering the trade”). 
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professions has increased. Where licensing was once reserved for lawyers, 
doctors, and other “learned professionals,” now floral designers,46 fortune 
tellers, and taxidermists47 are among the jobs that, at least in some states, 
require licensing. Licensing requirements are ubiquitous, although the 
extent of regulation differs dramatically between states. For example, 
Massachusetts licenses almost three times as many occupations as Rhode 
Island does.48  
Since boards are typically dominated by active members of the very pro-
fession that they are tasked with regulating, this dramatic shift toward 
licensing has put roughly a third of American workers under a regime of 
self-regulation. Our study of the composition and powers of all occupational 
licensing boards in Florida and Tennessee revealed that license-holders 
active in the profession have a majority on 90% of boards in Florida and 
93% of boards in Tennessee.49 Our empirical findings, which we report in 
the Appendix, corroborate the anecdotal references to “practitioner domi-
nance” in the legal and economic scholarship on occupational boards.50 
Given this composition, it is not surprising that boards often succumb to 
 
46 See Meadows v. Odom, 360 F. Supp. 2d 811, 823 (M.D. La. 2005), vacated as moot, 198 F. 
App’x 348 (5th Cir. 2006) (noting Louisiana’s licensing requirement in the floral profession). 
47 CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 16, at 10 tbl.1 (noting that twenty-six states require licensing 
for taxidermists). 
48 See Kleiner, supra note 2, at 199 (suggesting that state-by-state comparisons are one good 
way to structure economic analysis of licensing); see also Charles J. Wheelan, An Empirical 
Examination of the Political Economy of Occupational Licensure 100 (Mar. 1998) (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago) (on file with University of Chicago) (noting that the 
total number of professions that a state licenses is an obvious indicator of a state’s proclivity to 
license). 
49 For a table reporting our findings on the composition and rulemaking authority of boards in 
Florida and Tennessee, see Appendix. 
50 See, e.g., Jarod M. Bona, The Antitrust Implications of Licensed Occupations Choosing Their 
Own Exclusive Jurisdiction, 5 U. ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 28, 45 (2011) (noting that 
individuals have strong incentives “to expand the reach of their occupation to the detriment of 
both consumers and other occupations”); Clark C. Havighurst, Contesting Anticompetitive Actions 
Taken in the Name of the State: State Action Immunity and Health Care Markets, 31 J. HEALTH POL. 
POL’Y & L. 587, 596 (2006) (observing that board members are typically chosen from lists of 
nominees from within the profession itself, with one or two outside members); Kleiner, supra note 
2, at 191 (“Generally, members of the occupation dominate the licensing boards.”); see also COX & 
FOSTER, supra note 23, at 36-38 (conceding that members of the profession have valuable industry 
knowledge but acknowledging the accompanying dangers); Jared Ben Bobrow, Note, Antitrust 
Immunity for State Agencies: A Proposed Standard, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1484, 1496 (1985) (noting 
that some state statutes require licensing board members to have experience in the industry); 
J.R.R. II, Note, Due Process Limitations on Occupational Licensing, 59 VA. L. REV. 1097, 1118 (1973) 
(“[S]eventy-five percent of all occupational licensing boards are made up exclusively of practitioners 
licensed in the respective occupations.”). 
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the temptation of self-dealing, creating regulations to insulate incumbents 
rather than to ensure public welfare. 
B. The Anticompetitive Potential of Occupational Licensing 
This Section illustrates the anticompetitive potential of licensing regula-
tions as well as the breadth of occupations subject to licensing. A complete 
picture of state licensing activity is impossible, as there are thousands of 
professional boards operating in the United States. But a few snapshots 
suffice to show that the theoretical problems of self-regulation are all too 
real in practice. 
1. The New “Professions” 
Jobs once thought to be low-skill and low-stakes are increasingly coming 
under state regulation. In Louisiana, for example, all flower arranging must 
be supervised by a licensed florist.51 So when flower shop owner Monique 
Chauvin’s only licensed employee passed away, she found her business in 
violation of state law.52 Although Chauvin had run her New Orleans shop 
successfully for over ten years and her arrangements were frequently 
featured in magazines, she could have been subject to fines and even 
imprisonment if she continued to operate.53 One should note that the 
Louisiana Horticulture Commission uses money collected from the licensing 
scheme to fund enforcement actions against unlicensed practitioners, rather 
than using its authority to pursue complaints or alleged violations of its 
quality and safety requirements.54 Constitutional challenges against Louisi-
ana’s licensing scheme have proven unsuccessful. A federal court recently 
upheld the scheme, persuaded by an expert who claimed that licensing 
 
51 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3:3808(B)(1) (2010) (“A retail florist’s license authorizes the 
holder thereof to arrange or supervise the arrangement of floral designs which include living or 
freshly cut plant materials and to sell at retail floral designs, cut flowers, and ornamental plants in 
pots normally and customarily sold by florists.”). 
52 See Freeing Louisiana Florists: Licensing Law is Blooming Nonsense, INST. JUST., http://www.ij.org/ 
freeing-louisiana-florists-licensing-law-is-blooming-nonsense (last visited Mar. 22, 2014) (telling 
Monique Chauvin’s story as an example of licensing gone too far). 
53 Id. 
54 The Louisiana Horticulture Commission governs licensure for landscape architects, land-
scape horticulturists, landscape irrigation contractors, arborists, and florists. The Commission held 
fourteen meetings between March 2008 and December 2011 and considered sixty-four cases. In 
sixty-two of those cases, the alleged infraction was practicing without a license. In only two cases 
did the Commission address violations of substantive rules governing the practice of horticulture. 
For board meeting minutes, see Horticulture Commission Meeting Minutes, ST. LA. BOARDS & 
COMMISSIONS, https://wwwprd.doa.louisiana.gov/boardsandcommissions/viewMeetingMinutes. 
cfm?board=475 (last visited Mar. 22, 2014). 
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“prevents the public from having any injury” from exposed picks, broken 
wires, or infected flowers.55 But the court also noted that the regulation 
could stand even without a public health justification—“industry protection-
ism” was itself a legitimate state interest.56 
As another example, Minnesota (along with several other states57) now 
defines the filing of horse teeth as the practice of veterinary medicine, a 
move that has redefined an old vocation as a regulated profession subject to 
restricted entry and practice rules. This put Chris Johnson, a “teeth-floater” 
for hire, out of work. Although his family had practiced this routine, 
noninvasive, and painless procedure58 for satisfied customers for genera-
tions, the Minnesota Veterinary Board sent Johnson a cease-and-desist 
letter. Since his business did not employ veterinarians to supervise the teeth 
floating, continued operation would be considered an unlicensed practice of 
veterinary medicine, which carries severe penalties in Minnesota. Johnson 
lost a constitutional challenge against the rule.59 
Several states even prohibit the sale of caskets by anyone other than 
licensed funeral directors.60  This restriction outlawed businesses like a 
Benedictine monks’ woodshop at Saint Joseph Abbey in Louisiana.61 For 
years, the monks had made simple pine coffins to bury their departed. But 
when they opened their shop to the public to help cover the costs of their 
healthcare, the State Board of Embalmers and Funeral Directors (a body 
with only one member from outside the industry62) found the competition 
unwelcome. It served the monks with a cease-and-desist letter, threatening 
jail time and a fine.63 The monks never handled bodies or planned funeral 
 
55 Meadows v. Odom, 360 F. Supp. 2d 811, 824 (M.D. La. 2005), vacated as moot, 198 F. App’x 
348 (5th Cir. 2006). 
56 Id. at 824-25. 
57 See State Summary Report: Authority of Veterinary Technicians and Other Non-Veterinarians to 
Perform Dental Procedures, AM. MED. ASS’N, https://www.avma.org/advocacy/stateandlocal/pages/ 
sr-dental-procedures.aspx (last updated Oct. 2013) (listing each state’s scope of practice for non-
veterinarians). 
58 A domesticated horse’s modern diet is not coarse enough to wear down its teeth naturally, 
which never stop growing. Horse teeth therefore require periodic filing, or “floating.” For more 
information on Johnson’s story and the industry generally, see Challenging Barriers to Economic 
Opportunity: Challenging Minnesota’s Occupational Licensing of Horse Teeth Floaters, INST. JUST., 
http://www.ij.org/minnesota-horse-teeth-floating-background (last visited Mar 22, 2014). 
59 Johnson v. Minn. Bd. of Veterinary Med., No. 27-CV-06-16914 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 4th Judi-
cial Dist. June 25, 2008).  
60 See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:831(35)-(36) (2007) (defining “funeral director” under 
Louisiana law as one with a valid license to perform all aspects of “funeral directing,” which 
includes the sale of caskets and other funeral merchandise).  
61 See St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 700 F.3d 154 (5th Cir. 2012). 
62 Id. at 159. 
63 See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:850 (2007). 
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services.64  They simply drop-shipped the empty caskets to mortuaries, 
offering an inexpensive and simple alternative to the extravagant caskets 
typically sold at funeral homes. And although Louisiana restricts the sale of 
caskets, it does not regulate the design of caskets or even require that bodies 
be buried in a casket at all.65  
For a final example, we turn to the beauty industry. State cosmetology 
boards have responded to competition from two increasingly popular 
practices—African-style hair braiding and eyebrow threading—by demanding 
that braiders and threaders obtain cosmetology licenses before they can 
lawfully practice their craft.66 Neither practice requires sharp instruments or 
chemicals, and neither involves a significant risk of infection. Now many 
state cosmetology boards want braiders and threaders to attend two years of 
school (with a price tag of $16,000) to learn cosmetology procedures and 
techniques irrelevant to their practice, pass an exam, and pay yearly dues to 
maintain a license in cosmetology—a profession they have no interest in 
practicing.67  
For Texas entrepreneur Ashish Patel, this meant shuttering his success-
ful brow threading business and firing his employees after the state upheld 
the licensing requirements against his constitutional challenge.68 For hair 
braider Amber Starks, it means crossing the border daily from her native 
Oregon, where hair braiders are explicitly required to have a cosmetology 
license, to Washington, where they are not.69 The majority of her clientele 
come from Oregon as well, but they make the trip over the border to get 
their preferred hairstyle at a price they can afford.70 The millions of cus-
tomers that live far away from the eleven states that exempt hair braiders 
from the cosmetology license requirements71 must either find a practitioner 
willing to flout the board or pay cartel prices. 
 
64 St. Joseph Abbey, 700 F.3d at 157. 
65 Id. After several years of litigation, the monks finally won a constitutional challenge 
against the restriction. Id. 
66 See Goldstein, supra note 26, at 20 (describing the challenges that an African-style hair 
braider faced when seeking an exemption from Utah’s licensing requirements). 
67 Id. 
68 See Monica Luhar, Threading Licensing in Texas Tied Up in Debate, Lawsuit, INDIA WEST, 
Mar. 30, 2012, at B1, available at http://indiawest.com/news/3739-Threading-Licensing-in-Texas-
Tied-Up-in-Debate—Lawsuit.html (discussing a lawsuit filed by eight plaintiffs against the Texas 
Department of Licensing and Regulation).  
69 See Anna Griffin, Braiding African American Hair at Center of Overregulation Battle in Oregon, 
THE OREGONIAN (Aug. 11, 2012), http://www.oregonlive.com/politics/index.ssf/2012/08/braiding_ 
african_american_hair.html (describing Starks’s challenge to an Oregon law). 
70 Id.  
71 Id.  
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2. Old Professions, New Restrictions 
For some professions, licensing provides such an obvious public benefit 
that barriers to entry and regulation of practice are accepted as necessary 
evils. But while some professions may require restrictions to ensure quality 
and public safety, a close examination of restrictions in those professions 
suggests that those boards, too, have abused their ability to self-regulate.  
For example, in many states, dental licensing boards restrict the number 
of hygienists a dentist can hire to two.72 The anticompetitive effects of this 
restriction are well known; in 1987, the FTC published a policy paper 
showing that dentist-to-hygienist ratios tend to raise prices but not quality.73 
According to some dentists, the ratio restrictions are necessary to prevent 
“hygiene mills”—practices that offer low-cost dental cleanings without 
advanced dental services like exams, diagnosis, and surgery.74 The American 
Dental Association (ADA) calls such practices unsafe, but since dental 
hygienists must themselves possess a license requiring extensive education 
on safe cleaning techniques,75 it seems clear that the main threat these 
“mills” pose is to dentists themselves, in the form of reduced demand for 
their services. At least one state has taken the hygienist restrictions further. 
In 2001, the South Carolina Board of Dentistry required that exams per-
formed by a licensed dentist accompany all cleanings.76 The rule frustrated 
the state legislature’s attempt to extend in-school dental cleanings to rural 
and other underserved children.  
Similarly, the advent of nurse practitioners and physician assistants has 
ignited a turf war between these “physician extenders” and doctors.77 Nurse 
practitioners and physician assistants are trained in some of the same skills 
 
72 LIANG & OGUR, supra note 20, at 6 (describing the increase in the number of states with 
such restrictions since 1970). 
73 See id. at 44-47 (estimating that, in 1982, the deadweight loss from the restrictions was 
$680-710 million in the sixteen states that imposed such restrictions); see also Morris M. Kleiner & 
Robert T. Kudrle, Does Regulation Affect Economic Outcomes? The Case of Dentistry, 43 J.L. & ECON. 
547, 549 (2000) (showing empirically that, at least for uninsured individuals, stricter licensing 
restrictions for dentists has only very little impact on quality). 
74 See VA. DEP’T OF PLANNING & BUDGET, REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE PRACTICE OF 
DENTISTRY AND DENTAL HYGIENE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH PROFESSIONS, 18 VAC 60-20, at 
10-11 (Jan. 22, 2002), available at http://townhall.virginia.gov/L/GetFile.cfm?File=C:%5CTownHall% 
5Cdocroot%5C21%5C1112%5C1954%5Cdhp1954%20dentistry%20(dental%20hygienists)-b.pdf. 
75 LIANG & OGUR, supra note 20, at 4-5. 
76 S.C. Bd. of Dentistry, 138 F.T.C. 229, 230 (2004) (stating that the legislature amended its 
law to require dental hygienists to work “under general supervision”). 
77 Carl B. Meyer, Science and Law: The Quest for the Neutral Expert Witness. A View from the 
Trenches, 12 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 35, 49 (1996–1997) (“[I]ntense turf battles have 
been fought between . . . doctors and nurse practitioners over the scope of responsibilities of the 
parties.”). 
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as family practice physicians but need not learn the more advanced skills 
essential to obtaining a medical degree. Thus, nurse practitioners’ education 
costs less than that of medical doctors, and nurse practitioners’ fees reflect 
those cost savings.78 For many procedures, outcome studies reveal that the 
extenders’ services are as safe and effective as that of physicians.79 Extenders 
have been essential to low-cost convenience clinics like CVS’s MinuteClinics 
and public health initiatives aimed at serving low-income individuals with 
restricted access to medical care.80  
Undoubtedly influenced by powerful lobbying from the American Medical 
Association (AMA), twelve states (including more populous states such as 
California, Texas, and Florida) require physician supervision over all nurse 
practitioner activity. 81  Several states prohibit nurse practitioners from 
prescribing medication.82 For the most part, state medical boards, made up 
primarily of physicians, hold the reins of competition—and decide the level 
of supervision required.  
Lawyers, too, use licensing to limit competition. Restrictions on bar en-
try and rules defining the ethical conduct of lawyers reveal that attorney-
licensing bodies have yielded to the temptation of self-dealing. Advertising 
restrictions insulate lawyers from competition from other lawyers who can 
claim better average outcomes for clients. For example, Alabama requires all 
attorney advertising to include the following disclaimer: “No representation 
is made that the quality of the legal services to be performed is greater than 
 
78 See Veritas Prep, Should You Go to Medical School or Nursing School?, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REP. (Aug. 29, 2011), http://usnews.com/education/blogs/medical-school-admissions-
doctor/2011/08/29/should-you-go-to-medical-school-or-nursing-school (describing the educational 
differences for nurse practitioners and doctors in terms of time, requirements, costs, and roles). 
79 See, e.g., Daniel Trampf & Jeff Oliphant, Licensed Athletic Trainers: A Traditional, Unique, 
and Proactive Approach in Wisconsin Sports Medicine, 103 WIS. MED. J. 33, 34 (2004) (“Outcome 
studies at the national level prove that patients utilizing athletic trainers demonstrate a significant 
reduction in re-injury rates, restricted workdays, and lost work time, and they have a 98% or 
greater patient satisfaction rating.”). 
80 See Elcha Shain Buckman, The Healthcare Climate and Communication (“The mission of 
[corporate-owned retail health] clinics is to . . . relieve the excessive time and costs of unneces-
sarily using emergency rooms and provide quality care and savings . . . for our millions of 
Medicaid, Medicare, underinsured, and uninsured citizens . . . .”), in PATIENT-PROVIDER 
COMMUNICATIONS: CARING TO LISTEN 64 (Valerie A. Hart ed., 2010).  
81 See State Practice Environment, AM. ASS’N NURSE PRAC., http://www.aanp.org/legislation-
regulation/state-practice-environment/66-legislation-regulation/state-practice-environment/1380-
state-practice-by-type (last visited Mar. 22, 2014) (categorizing states by licensing and regulatory 
requirements). 
82 Id. (explaining that sixteen states and the District of Columbia allow nurse practitioners to 
prescribe medication, while the remainder of states place restrictions or prohibitions on nurse 
practitioners’ ability to do so). 
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the quality of legal services performed by other lawyers.”83 In addition, 
many states define title certification and abstraction as the “practice of law,” 
which effectively inflates demand for legal services by requiring attorney 
representation at all real estate transactions.84 And the state ethical rules 
prohibiting “champerty”—selling an interest in the outcome of a lawsuit—
help contingency fee lawyers prop up the price of representation at thirty 
percent of the award.85 
Moreover, each state has its own bar exam and licensing procedure, 
which reduces lawyer mobility across state lines. Segmentation of the 
market means that lawyers in each state are insulated from out-of-state 
competition, allowing attorneys to charge higher legal fees than they could 
in a nationwide market. The justification for this is colorable—a different 
exam is necessary for each jurisdiction because of differing state laws—but 
it fails to account for practices such as California’s requirement that lawyers 
qualified in other states retake the multistate portion of the exam when 
sitting for the California bar.86  
Licensing bodies have also devised ways to restrict competition among 
law schools and among law professors. In 1995, the Department of Justice 
(DOJ) challenged the American Bar Association’s (ABA) law school accredi-
tation standards that required schools to pay faculty “compensa-
tion . . . comparable with that of other ABA-approved schools,” limited 
teaching obligations to eight hours per week, and required schools to provide 
professors with paid leaves of absence.87 Although the ABA entered a consent 
 
83 ALA. CODE OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.2(e) (West 2013). 
84 The FTC has written letters to state bar associations that are considering whether to im-
plement restrictions on who may participate in loan closings. The FTC has urged bar associations 
to avoid “the anticompetitive consequences of rules that prevent nonlawyers from conducting 
closings.” FTC OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING, REPORT OF THE STATE ACTION TASK 
FORCE 68 (2003) [hereinafter STATE ACTION TASK FORCE]. 
85 Max Schanzenbach & David Dana, How Would Third Party Financing Change the Face of 
American Tort Litigation? The Role of Agency Costs in the Attorney-Client Relationship 6 (Sept. 
14, 2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors). Professors Dana and Schanzenbach 
explore the efficiencies of allowing third-party assignment and highlight the anticompetitive effect 
of a rule allowing assignment only to attorneys. They point out that “the emergence of a full 
assignment market would undermine the ability of contingency fee firm lawyers to charge as much 
as they do”—champerty would create a competitive market for legal claims and likely reduce fees 
to below the traditional (and suspiciously stable) thirty percent that contingency lawyers currently 
charge. Dana and Schanzenbach argue that this pay cut partially explains why legislation allowing 
champerty lacks attorney support. Id. at 5. 
86 Thirteen other states also require retaking the MBE (Multistate Bar Examination). Bar 
Exam / MBE Transfer, BARRECIPROCITY.COM, http://barreciprocity.com/bar-exam-mbe-transfer 
(last visited Mar. 22, 2014). 
87 Competitive Impact Statement at 5, United States v. Am. Bar Ass’n, 934 F. Supp. 435 
(D.D.C. 1996) (No. 95-1211), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f1000/1034.htm. 
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decree that eliminated some of the most anticompetitive rules, 88  they 
replaced them with standards that have the same anticompetitive effects.89 
In the same vein, the ABA allegedly refused to accredit the Massachusetts 
School of Law at Andover (MSLA) for pretextual reasons. MSLA sued, 
accusing the ABA of enforcing a group boycott and conspiring to monopo-
lize legal education in violation of the Sherman Act.90 The school lost on 
state action grounds.91  
Another device that many professions now use to restrict competition is 
the apprenticeship. Many state licensing boards require apprenticeships for 
would-be professionals, essentially guaranteeing incumbents low-cost labor 
and raising barriers to entry. 92  For example, most states’ funeral and 
mortuary licensing boards require an applicant to complete a one-year 
apprenticeship under a licensed funeral director in addition to education 
and testing requirements.93 Similarly, some states require lengthy appren-
ticeships for aspiring psychotherapists. California requires a total of 3000 
hours of therapy under the supervision of a licensed therapist at that 
therapist’s place of work.94 Interns cannot receive compensation directly 
from patients, but rather they can only be paid, if at all, by their supervising 
therapist.95 And the statute actually limits supervision to five hours per 
week, restraining competition among therapists for interns.96  
 
88 Id. at 9-12 (discussing the conditions outlined in the proposed final judgment). 
89 For example, where the 1995 standards limited teaching loads to eight hours per week, the 
modern standards emphasize that professors should have enough time, in addition to teaching, for 
research; scholarship; “keep[ing] abreast of developments in their specialties”; and fulfilling obligations 
to the law school, university community, profession, and the public. ABA, STANDARDS AND RULES 
OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS, Standard 404, 34 (2011-2012), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/misc/legal_education/Standards/standardsar
chive/2011_2012_standards_and_rules_complete_book.authcheckdam.pdf. Thus, the ABA can make a 
compelling argument that any school requiring more than eight hours per week of teaching violates this 
provision. For a list of contemporary restrictions on law schools, see generally id. 
90 Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover, Inc. v. Am. Bar Ass’n, 107 F.3d 1026, 1031 (3d Cir. 1997). 
91 Id. at 1038 (granting the ABA Noerr immunity). 
92 Wayne McCormack, Economic Substantive Due Process and the Right of Livelihood, 82 KY. 
L.J. 397, 410 (1993–1994) (identifying medicine and architecture as examples).  
93 For a state-by-state breakdown of license, education, and apprenticeship requirements, see 
Licensing Boards and Requirements, NAT’L FUNERAL DIRECTORS ASS’N (Apr. 5, 2011), 
http://www.nfda.org/licensing-boards-and-requirements.html. 
94 See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 4980.43 (2014) (detailing requirements that interns or 
trainees must complete before applying for licensing examinations). 
95 Id. § 4980.43(h). 
96 Id. § 4980.43(c)(2). 
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II. THE ROAD TO PROFESSIONAL CARTELIZATION 
State professional boards arose from a belief that, for some professions, 
inexpert practice would be socially inefficient or even dangerous. Licensing 
created a mechanism by which the government could prevent incompetent 
practitioners from participating in the market. Regulation was justified by 
the idea that the public benefits outweighed the costs of higher prices and 
reduced economic liberty.97 But unlike other regulatory bodies, licensing 
boards became dominantly comprised of practitioners themselves.98 The 
theory was that only members of a profession had the expertise necessary to 
define efficient rules for entry and practice, but self-dealing is inevitable 
when the regulated act as regulators.99 Thus, the board-as-cartel was born.  
This Part tells the economic and legal stories of anticompetitive licensing 
in the United States. Section A reviews the economic theory behind 
licensing, identifying its potential costs and benefits. It explains that 
licensing schemes that raise consumer prices and yield little benefit to 
anyone other than incumbent practitioners are socially wasteful. But, as 
Section B details, state licensing boards have virtually free rein to enact this 
socially wasteful regulation. 
A. The Economics of Licensing 
Licensing has long been an obsession of economists, including Milton 
Friedman, who dedicated an entire chapter to the topic in his 1962 book, 
Capitalism and Freedom.100 But the past twenty years have witnessed an 
explosion of empirical work on the effects of licensing restrictions on 
service quality and price, led most prominently by Morris Kleiner at the 
University of Minnesota. The work of Kleiner and his contemporaries 
reveals a consensus in the academy: a licensing restriction can only be 
 
97 See KLEINER, supra note 3, at 44-48 (discussing various theories of why occupations are 
regulated); see also Lee Benham, The Demand for Occupational Licensure (“Licensed occupations 
place great emphasis on convincing the larger society of the benefits associated with their 
licensure . . . .”), in OCCUPATIONAL LICENSURE AND REGULATION 13, 17 (Simon Rottenberg 
ed., 1980); Wheelan, supra note 48, at 6 (discussing the three traditional public-interest justifica-
tions for licensing). 
98 See supra text accompanying notes 49-50 and Appendix A; see also Kleiner, supra note 2, at 
191 (“Generally, members of the occupation dominate the licensing boards.”). 
99 See COX & FOSTER, supra note 23, at 36-38 (discussing the impact of self-regulation on 
the public). 
100 MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM, ch. IX (1962); see also 1 ADAM 
SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, bk. I, ch. 10, pt. II (George Bell & Sons 1908) (1776) 
(observing that guilds raise earnings by limiting the availability of apprenticeships and lengthening 
their duration), cited in KLEINER, supra note 3, at 3.  
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justified where it leads to better quality professional services—and for many 
restrictions, proof of that enhanced quality is lacking.101  
1. The Costs of Licensing: Higher Prices, Lower Quantity 
Licensing restrictions can affect price along four dimensions. First, pro-
fessional licensing can act as a barrier to entry into the profession.102 
Second, licensing can establish rules of practice, like advertising bans, that 
restrict competition.103 Third, state boards can suppress interstate competi-
tion by recognizing licenses only from their own state.104 Finally, a profes-
sion can prevent competition by broadening the definition of its practice, 
bringing more potential competitors under its licensing scheme.105 These 
“scope-of-practice” limitations tend to oust low-cost competitors that 
operate at the fringes of an established profession.106 
 
101 See KLEINER, supra note 3, at 8 (“The major public policy justification for occupational 
licensing lies in its role in improving quality of service rendered . . . . [T]he effect of regulation 
on the level of service quality is uncertain.”); REBECCA LEBUHN & DAVID A. SWANKIN, 
CITIZEN ADVOCACY CTR., REFORMING SCOPES OF PRACTICE 3 (2010) (“The stated purpose 
[of state licensing laws] is to ensure consumers that healthcare workers conduct their practices in 
areas for which they are properly trained.”); Sidney L. Carroll & Robert J. Gaston, Occupational 
Licensing and the Quality of Service, 7 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 139, 145 (1983) (“[L]icensing has gone 
far enough to ensure adequate quality in most places and has gone too far in others.”); Morris M. 
Kleiner, Enhancing Quality or Restricting Competition: The Case of Licensing Public School Teachers, 5 
U. ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 3, 8 (2010) [hereinafter Kleiner, Enhancing Quality] (“The 
general rationale for licensing is the health and safety of consumers. Beyond that, the quality of 
service delivery . . . [is] sometimes invoked.”); Morris M. Kleiner & Charles Wheelan, 
Occupational Licensing Matters: Wages, Quality and Social Costs, CESIFO DICE REP., Mar. 2010, at 
29, 29 (“Of course, these labor market distortions must be weighed against any potential gains to 
consumers from the quality improvements in the licensed profession. Yet even the putative 
benefits of licensure have come under academic assault.”); Morris M. Kleiner, Occupational 
Licensing: Protecting the Public Interest or Protectionism? 4 (W.E. Upjohn Inst., Policy Paper No. 2011-
009, 2011) [hereinafter Kleiner, Protecting the Public Interest or Protectionism?], available at 
http://research.upjohn.org/up_policypapers/9 (“[S]everal studies have found a number of cases 
where licensing reduces employment, increases prices, but does not result in better services.”). 
102 See Kleiner, supra note 2, at 192 (describing methods by which licensing curtails labor 
supply); see also Simon Rottenberg, Introduction to OCCUPATIONAL LICENSURE AND REGULA-
TION, supra note 97, at 1, 2. 
103 See John E. Kwoka, Jr., Advertising and the Price and Quality of Optometric Services, 74 AM. 
ECON. REV. 211, 216 (1984) (concluding from data in the optometry profession that advertising 
increases competition but nonadvertising increases quality). 
104 See Kleiner, supra note 2, at 192-93 (providing examples of limitations such as tougher 
examination pass rates and longer residency requirements). 
105 See Kleiner & Krueger, supra note 7, at S178 (“For example, the work of ‘hair braiders,’ 
which is an unlicensed profession, could be brought under the control of the cosmetology board 
and limited to only licensed cosmetologists or barbers.”). 
106 Id. 
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It is worth starting this cost analysis with what makes a professional li-
censing cartel different from a typical cartel. A typical price-fixing cartel 
will only be effective if an industry has a small number of firms; otherwise, 
the temptation to cut price and expand output will be too great. Licensing 
boards, however, can effectively raise price despite thousands of market 
participants. Sometimes they work by muting price competition among 
members through direct restrictions on professional practice, but that is not 
the only way. Limiting the number of licensed professionals by making entry 
difficult—and unauthorized entry illegal—raises prices because it limits 
supply, and it does so even if licensed participants compete vigorously.107 
Unlike firms, which may be able to expand without bound, a licensed 
professional can only provide so much service herself. Boards can further 
limit supply by controlling what unlicensed workers can produce and how 
they must be supervised; the rule requiring that dentists supervise a maxi-
mum of two hygienists is an example. As a result, licensing boards can limit 
output and raise price even with thousands of competing professionals, 
much as cartelized oligopolies can in other industries.  
Economists have studied extensively the effects of these professional 
licensing requirements on price and, less extensively, quantity of services. 
Studies that have the statistical power to identify an effect tend to show an 
increase in price and a reduction in quantity.108 Mandatory entry require-
ments—such as examinations or educational prerequisites—tend to raise 
consumer prices, but estimating the effect with any certainty has proven 
difficult.109 One 2006 study estimated that licensing requirements raise 
wages by 10% to 12%.110 Newer data suggest that licensing raises hourly 
wages by 18%.111 A 2000 study showed that tougher licensing, in the form of 
 
107 See Kleiner & Wheelan, supra note 101, at 32 (illustrating this point using a hypothetical 
restriction on prospective teachers). 
108 See KLEINER, supra note 3, at 8-11. Since professional licensing is mostly the prerogative 
of individual states, economists have used the United States as a kind of natural experiment to 
observe price differences under different licensing regimes. Studies of the effects of licensing on 
price typically adopt one or more of three basic methodologies. First, studies can compare prices 
in professions before and after states’ imposition of licensing requirements. Second, studies can 
compare prices of professional services in a state that requires a license with prices in a state that 
does not (interstate study). Finally, economists can compare wages (as a proxy for price) between 
licensed professions and unlicensed professions that require similar education levels, similar day-
to-day responsibilities, and lifestyle. See generally Kleiner & Kudrle, supra note 73, at 548-49.  
109 See Kleiner, supra note 2, at 197 (“[R]elatively little empirical work has looked at issues 
involving the quality of output or the demand-side response to these quality effects.”). 
110 Morris M. Kleiner, Regulating Occupations: Quality or Monopoly?, EMP’T RES. (W.E. 
Upjohn Inst., Kalamazoo, Mich.), Jan. 2006, at 2 tbl.1, available at http://research.upjohn.org/ 
empl_research/vol13/iss1/1. 
111 Kleiner & Krueger, supra note 7, at S185.  
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lower pass rates on the qualifying exam, increased prices for dental services 
by 11%.112  
Similarly, most studies examining practice restrictions show that when a 
licensing board is more heavy-handed in dictating hours, advertising, or 
levels of supervision within a profession, the consumer prices are higher. 
For example, one team of researchers estimated that restricting the number 
of hygienists a dentist may employ increased the cost of a dental visit by 
7%,113 resulting in an estimated $700 million cost to consumers in 1982.114 
Restrictions on advertising by lawyers is associated with an increase in 
price,115 and in optometry, restrictions on advertising have been shown to 
inflate prices by at least 20%.116 Geographic restrictions—like nonreciprocity 
between states—also tend to increase consumer prices.117 
Because the nature of licensed practice is not to produce physical goods 
that can be counted, measuring output as a function of licensing restrictions 
has been a less attractive method for economists to measure licensure’s 
effect on competition. Several studies, however, have analyzed its effect on a 
related issue: employment growth. Here, the results have been more mixed 
than in the price context. One 1981 study examining electricians, dentists, 
plumbers, sanitarians, and veterinarians found that licensing reduces the 
number of practitioners in a given field.118 Yet other studies have failed to 
measure any appreciable effect of licensing on the supply of barbers119 and 
nurses.120  
If licensing increases consumer prices, then some consumers must go 
without professional services—these are the services they could afford in a 
 
112 Kleiner & Kudrle, supra note 73, at 572-73. 
113 LIANG & OGUR, supra note 20, at 40, 43. 
114 Id. at 47. 
115 See WILLIAM W. JACOBS ET AL., FTC, IMPROVING CONSUMER ACCESS TO LEGAL 
SERVICES: THE CASE FOR REMOVING RESTRICTIONS ON TRUTHFUL ADVERTISING 106 
tbl.D (1984) (finding many instances of a statistically significant higher price for legal work in 
areas with restrictions on advertising). 
116 Kwoka, supra note 103, at 216. 
117 One study estimated that universal reciprocity among states for dentists would result in a 
geographical reallocation of dentists generating $52 million (in 1978 prices) in consumer surplus. 
Bryan L. Boulier, An Empirical Examination of the Influence of Licensure and Licensure Reform on the 
Geographical Distribution of Dentists, in OCCUPATIONAL LICENSURE AND REGULATION, supra 
note 97, at 73, 94-95. 
118 Carroll & Gaston, supra note 101, at 143, 145. 
119 See Thornton & Weintraub, supra note 45, at 249 (finding that licensing requirements had 
a minimal impact on the number of barbers entering the profession). 
120 See William D. White, Mandatory Licensure of Registered Nurses: Introduction and Impact, in 
OCCUPATIONAL LICENSURE AND REGULATION, supra note 97, at 47, 68. 
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world without licensing.121 Some would-be practitioners lose out as well; 
these are the individuals who do not have licenses but would like to compete 
with the licensed professionals by offering low-cost services.122 A state’s 
ability to cite and even prosecute unlicensed practitioners deters these low-
cost transactions; in economic terms, these deterred low-cost transactions 
are the deadweight loss from licensing.123 
The story, however, might not be so simple. To get a complete picture of the 
world but-for licensing, one needs a theory of how efficiently an unrestricted 
market would function.124 Advocates of licensing argue that the free market 
does a poor job of efficiently allocating professional services to consumers 
because service quality would be too low without licensing.125 The notion 
that a free market would result in too-low quality service rests on two 
possible sources of failure in the market for professional services. First, 
absent licensing, the asymmetry of information between professional 
providers and consumers about the quality of service126 would create what 
economists call the “lemons problem.” Second, free markets for professional 
services would result in sub-optimal quality because the market participants 
(providers and consumers) do not internalize all the costs of bad service.127 
In other words, a free market for professional services creates negative 
externalities.  
The lemons problem, first articulated by George Akerlof in 1970, occurs 
in a market where products vary in quality but consumers cannot reliably 
distinguish good products from bad ones.128 If consumers cannot distinguish 
between good and bad professional service, the high-quality, high-price 
 
121 See KLEINER, supra note 3, at 43 (quoting an article about a farm worker who performed 
two root canals on himself because he could not afford dental services). 
122 See Kleiner, supra note 2, at 192-93 (describing the deterrent effect of licensing, which may 
lead to greater entry into unlicensed professions). 
123 See Kleiner, Enhancing Quality, supra note 101, at 4 (noting that using licensing require-
ments as a gatekeeping mechanism can lead to negative consequences); see also Kleiner & 
Wheelan, supra note 101, at 31 (“When members of the legal profession told Milton Friedman that 
every lawyer should be a Cadillac, he famously replied that many people would be better off with a 
Chevy . . . .”). 
124 See Kleiner & Wheelan, supra note 101, at 30 (comparing and contrasting certification 
regimes with licensure regimes). 
125 See Kleiner, supra note 2, at 191; see also Benham, supra note 97 (“Almost all licensed occu-
pations have claimed they will successfully cope with undesirable market failures.”). 
126 Alex R. Maurizi, The Impact of Regulation on Quality: The Case of California Contractors, in 
OCCUPATIONAL LICENSURE AND REGULATION, supra note 97, at 26. 
127 See COX & FOSTER, supra note 23, at 10-11 (discussing how reputation and litigation will 
likely be efficient to control the problem of externalities only in some circumstances). 
128 See George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mech-
anism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 489 (1970) (explaining that buyers possess imperfect information when 
purchasing a car because they do not know whether the car “will be good or a lemon”). 
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providers will not be able to attract even those customers who both want 
and can pay for better quality service.129 Unable to obtain a premium for 
their service, high-quality providers will either exit the market or reduce the 
quality of the service to match their low-quality, low-cost competitors.130 
This leads to deadweight loss in the form of deterred transactions between 
high-quality providers and high-quality demanding consumers.131 Licensure 
addresses the information asymmetry at the root of the lemons problem by 
assuring consumers that all providers meet a minimum quality standard.  
The second market failure possibly addressed by licensure occurs when 
low-price, low-quality transactions impose costs on third parties. An 
individual may be willing to receive poor service for a low price rather than 
no service at all, but only because she does not have to bear the full costs of 
bad service (e.g., treatment in a public hospital for infection from a careless 
barber or a nuisance settlement of a frivolous suit filed by an unscrupulous 
lawyer). Licensure can improve public safety by imposing quality standards 
on professionals through education or examination and by setting rules of 
professional practice. 
It may not be fair to say that professional licensure results in deadweight 
loss by harming competition if it also avoids the deadweight loss (associated 
with the lemons problem and negative externalities) that would obtain in a 
free market. But the cure must not be worse than the disease: a procompeti-
tive licensing scheme should avoid more deadweight loss than it creates. 
Quantifying the social harm from licensure on the one hand, and from free-
but-inefficient markets for professional services on the other, is difficult. 
But if licensing has any effect on the market failures it is designed to 
address, then it should improve service quality. Put simply, if licensure 
works, quality of service should improve.132  
2. The Benefits of Licensing: Improved Quality? 
The economic research on quality of service as a function of licensing 
paints a murky picture. Some studies show modest increases in quality,133 at 
 
129 See COX & FOSTER, supra note 23, at 5-6. 
130 Id. at 6. 
131 Id. 
132 Kleiner, supra note 2, at 191-92. 
133 See KLEINER, supra note 3, at 53 tbl.3.2 (showing varying levels of quality improvements 
in a number of licensed professions); Carroll & Gaston, supra note 101, at 145 (concluding that 
licensing results in better delivered quality but not better quality received by society as a whole); 
Kleiner & Kudrle, supra note 73, at 575 (suggesting that licensing increased the quality of dental 
visits but not overall dental health); Carl Shapiro, Investment, Moral Hazard, and Occupational 
Licensing, 53 REV. ECON. STUD. 843, 850-51 (1986) (finding an overall increase in service quality 
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least for some kinds of consumers, but other studies do not find that same 
effect.134 A few studies even claim to show that licensing reduces quality.135 
Part of the explanation for the mixed results may be the difficulty of 
assessing the quality of professional services;136 this is the very source of the 
lemons problem that licensing is designed to address. Researchers have used 
a variety of ingenious methods to evaluate the quality of professional 
services in the last few decades, but none is without its flaws. 
Alex Maurizi, for example, used the number of consumer complaints 
lodged with the California Contractors’ State License Board as a proxy for 
the quality of service provided by professional contractors.137 He hypothe-
sized that if barriers to entry (a licensing examination in this case) were 
effective in eliminating low-quality providers, then lower pass rates should 
be associated with higher quality service.138 In fact, he found the opposite.139 
Similarly, economists have used malpractice litigation rates to measure the 
quality of professional outcomes.140 Using consumer dissatisfaction to gauge 
quality has obvious limits because consumers may not take the initiative to 
formalize their unhappy experience in a complaint or lawsuit.141  
 
due to licensing, but finding that consumers who put little value on quality are worse off because 
of higher prices). 
134 See Joshua D. Angrist & Jonathan Guryan, Teacher Testing, Teacher Education, and Teacher 
Characteristics, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 241, 246 (2004) (“[T]here is . . . no evidence that testing 
hurdles have raised the quality of new and inexperienced teachers . . . .”); Thomas J. Kane et al., 
What Does Certification Tell Us About Teacher Effectiveness? Evidence from New York City, 27 ECON. 
EDUC. REV. 615, 629 (2008) (“We find little difference in the average academic achievement 
impacts of certified, uncertified and alternatively certified teachers.”); Morris M. Kleiner & Daniel 
L. Petree, Unionism and Licensing of Public School Teachers: Impact on Wages and Educational Output 
(concluding that teacher licensing has “ambiguous effects” on student performance), in WHEN 
PUBLIC SECTOR WORKERS UNIONIZE 305, 317 (Richard B. Freeman & Casey Ichniowski eds., 
1988); Robert Gordon et al., Identifying Effective Teachers Using Performance on the Job 30 (The 
Hamilton Project, Discussion Paper No. 2006-01, 2006) (“[R]aising the hurdles for entry into the 
teaching profession a little higher is not likely to generate a watershed improvement in teacher 
quality.”). 
135 See Carroll & Gaston, supra note 101, at 145 (suggesting that “excessive restriction” reduces 
the quality of services available to the “lower middle income classes”); Maurizi, supra note 126, at 
34 (“[C]onsumers may be receiving a quality of service quite similar to what would prevail in the 
absence of licensing, and they may be paying higher prices for that quality.”). 
136 Kleiner, supra note 2, at 198. 
137 Maurizi, supra note 126, at 27-29. 
138 Id. at 31-34. 
139 Id. 
140 See, e.g., KLEINER, supra note 3, at 57-58. 
141 Maurizi, supra note 126, at 27-28 (challenging the assumption that increases in low-quality 
work will “produce an equivalent increase in the number of voiced complaints”). But see KLEINER, 
supra note 3, at 56 (“[L]icensing makes an occupation more visible and sets up rules and regula-
tions that make lawsuits easier to file.”). 
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Sometimes quality can be measured directly by looking at actual out-
comes from professional services. For example, Kleiner used test scores to 
measure the effect of licensing requirements for public school teachers on 
student performance.142 His study ultimately did not show an effect from 
licensing.143 Using a similar outcome-based technique, Kleiner and Kudrle 
analyzed dental exam results from new enlistees in the U.S. Air Force. They 
found that, for uninsured individuals, the strictness of licensing require-
ments for dentists in their home states did not impact enlistees’ dental 
health at the time of enlistment.144 
B. The Legal Landscape of Professional Licensing 
Where researchers have been able to show that licensing improves quality, 
existing regulation might be addressing the market failures caused by 
information asymmetry and negative externalities. If so, and if the benefits 
of licensing outweigh its harm to competition, then it is socially desirable. 
But under the dominant interpretation of antitrust immunity, state licensing 
boards never have to balance the procompetitive benefits of a restriction 
against its anticompetitive effects. While all other combinations of competi-
tors operate in Sherman’s shadow, licensing boards have mostly escaped 
antitrust suits—allowing them to create rules that maximize welfare for 
incumbent professionals at the expense of everyone else. That leaves only 
constitutional avenues of redress, which have proven to be weak against self-
dealing boards. 
1. Twin Immunities Shield State Licensing Boards from  
Antitrust Liability 
Licensing requirements are essentially agreements, usually among com-
petitors, to create barriers to entry into their profession. These incumbent 
professionals reap the rewards of weaker competition in the form of higher 
prices and higher profits. This conduct sounds, on its face, like a perfect 
 
142 See Kleiner, Enhancing Quality, supra note 101, at 6-8; see also KLEINER, supra note 3, at 54 
(calling test scores “a generally recognized measure of ‘quality’ in education”). 
143 Kleiner, Enhancing Quality, supra note 101, at 11-13; see also Kane et al., supra note 134, at 629. 
144 Kleiner & Kudrle, supra note 73. For those with insurance coverage (which was also asso-
ciated with higher income), however, tougher state regulations on dentistry improved average 
dental health. Id. at 575-76. The results of the Air Force study exemplify an interesting finding of 
some quality studies: positive quality effects, where found, tend to be limited to higher-end 
consumers. See, e.g., Carroll & Gaston, supra note 101, at 145 (showing that licensing improved 
practitioner quality but decreased overall service quality for consumers by creating a practitioner 
shortage). 
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target for Sherman Act liability. But with Parker v. Brown145 and Eastern 
Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.,146 the Supreme 
Court has created twin immunities that make antitrust suits over state 
licensure regulation very difficult. 
Parker created antitrust immunity for “state action,” which shields state 
governments and bodies delegated a state’s authority from federal antitrust 
liability.147 In the line of cases following Parker, the Court defined the 
contours of the immunity to include all bodies “clearly authorized” by the 
state to restrict competition. 148  In most cases, where these bodies are 
deemed private actors, these bodies must also be subject to active supervi-
sion by the state itself.149 State action immunity bars suits by aggrieved 
competitors and public enforcers alike. In Noerr, the Court held that private 
individuals and organizations cannot be sued under the Sherman Act for 
attempting to influence government action—by either filing a law suit or 
lobbying a legislature—even if their intent and effect is anticompetitive.150 
Together, these doctrines “are complementary expressions of the principle 
that the antitrust laws regulate business, not politics.”151  
a. Parker and State Action Immunity  
In Parker, the Supreme Court rejected antitrust claims against what was 
essentially a price-fixing scheme among competitors because the scheme had 
been blessed by the state of California.152 In holding that the Sherman Act 
does not apply to state government action, the Court found the identity of 
the actor—the state or private citizens—essential but provided no guidance 
on how to draw the line.153 This created serious problems for lower courts 
trying to apply Parker because states rarely regulate economic activity 
directly through a legislative act. Rather, states delegate rulemaking and 
 
145 317 U.S. 341 (1943). 
146 365 U.S. 127 (1961). 
147 Parker, 317 U.S. at 350-51 (“We find nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its 
history which suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or agents from 
activities directed by its legislature.”). 
148 See, e.g., Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 
(1980) (“First, the challenged restraint must be one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed 
as state policy . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
149 See, e.g., id. (“[S]econd, the policy must be actively supervised by the State itself.” (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)). 
150 Noerr, 365 U.S. at 136. 
151 City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 383 (1991). 
152 Parker, 317 U.S. at 351. 
153 Id. at 352. 
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rate-setting to agencies, councils, or boards dominated by private citizens.154 
Are these bodies arms of the state or collections of private actors?  
The Court responded in 1982 with California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n 
v. Midcal Aluminum Inc.,155 which provided a test to distinguish private 
action from state action. To enjoy state action immunity, the Court held, the 
challenged restraint must be “one clearly articulated and affirmatively 
expressed as state policy to restrict competition,” and the policy must be 
“actively supervised by the State itself.”156 For many potential defendants, 
the Midcal rule thus shifted the battleground from the public–private bounda-
ry to the precise meanings of “clear articulation” and “active supervision.” In 
no fewer than ten decisions refining Midcal’s two-step test,157 the Court has 
made clear that virtually any colorable claim to state authority can be all the 
articulation necessary.158 The supervision requirement, in contrast, can have 
real bite.  
Since Midcal, however, the Court has created a category of entities not 
subject to the supervision requirement at all. 159  These entities, which 
include municipalities,160 enjoy immunity if they can meet the clear articula-
tion prong alone. The question in the recent Fourth Circuit case, currently 
under review by the Supreme Court, is whether licensing boards are like 
municipalities in this respect; in particular, whether a licensing board 
dominated by competitors—who regulate the way they compete and exclude  
 
 
154 For evidence of delegation in two states, see Appendix. 
155 445 U.S. 97 (1980). 
156 Id. at 105 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
157 For the evolution of the Midcal two-step test, see FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 
133 S. Ct. 1003, 1010-11 (2013); FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 633-37 (1992); City of 
Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 370-74 (1991); Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 
100-01 (1988); 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 341-45 (1987); Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 475 
U.S. 260, 267-70 (1986); Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 38-40 (1985); S. Motor 
Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 55-62 (1985); Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 
558, 567-69 (1984); Cmty. Comm’ns Co., Inc. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 48-51 (1982).  
158 Clear articulation need not be an affirmative statement about abrogating a competitive 
policy. See STATE ACTION TASK FORCE, supra note 84, at 8 (“To satisfy the ‘clear articulation’ 
standard, the case law provides that the state need not compel the anticompetitive conduct at 
issue . . . .”). And if a state creates a policy that has foreseeable anticompetitive effects, that 
policy is sufficient under Midcal’s first prong. See Hallie, 471 U.S. at 45. Indeed, since Midcal, the 
Supreme Court has rejected a clear articulation claim only twice. See Phoebe Putney Health Sys., 
Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1003; Cmty. Comm’ns Co., Inc., 455 U.S. 40. 
159 STATE ACTION TASK FORCE, supra note 84, at 18 (noting an exception for boards that 
“perform a public function and are directly accountable to the state”). 
160 See Hallie, 471 U.S. at 45 (“None of our cases involving the application of the state action 
exemption to a municipality has required that compulsion be shown.”). 
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would-be competitors—enjoy state action antitrust immunity without being 
supervised by the state.  
b. Noerr and Petitioning Immunity  
Whereas Parker immunity insulates public or quasi-public bodies from 
antitrust scrutiny, Noerr immunity shields private actors’ efforts in petitioning 
governments for anticompetitive restraints.161 Noerr and Parker immunities 
are, as Justice Scalia has observed, “two faces of the same coin”162—by 
disallowing suits against the private parties that influence state action, Noerr 
essentially closes a loophole left open by Parker. Noerr itself was a suit 
against a confederacy of railroad companies accused of persuading a state 
legislature to pass laws unfavorable to truckers.163 Even though the railroads 
had used deception in their campaign to influence the state legislature,164 
the Court found their actions to be immune to antitrust liability on federalism 
grounds.165 Later cases extended Noerr immunity to government petitioning 
through all avenues, including lawsuits166 and executive branch lobbying.167 
c. Immunity for Professional Licensing Boards Under Parker and Noerr 
Although many potential plaintiffs and scholars—and probably licensing 
board members—assume that state occupational boards operate outside of 
the Sherman Act’s reach,168 the question is more complex than it appears. 
 
161 See Omni, 499 U.S. at 379-80 (“The federal antitrust laws also do not regulate the con-
duct of private individuals in seeking anticompetitive action from the government.”); Allied 
Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 499 (1988) (“Concerted efforts to 
restrain or monopolize trade by petitioning government officials are protected from antitrust 
liability . . . .”). 
162 Omni, 499 U.S. at 383. 
163 E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 129-30 (1961). 
164 The defendants deceived the legislature by attributing their own antitrucking statements 
and studies to “bogus independent civic groups.” Marina Lao, Reforming the Noerr-Pennington 
Antitrust Immunity Doctrine, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 965, 972 (2003). 
165 Noerr, 365 U.S. at 137 (holding that allowing such liability would “substantially impair the 
power of government to take actions through its legislature and executive that operate to restrain 
trade”). 
166 See Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 60 
(1993) (“If an objective litigant could conclude that the suit is reasonably calculated to elicit a 
favorable outcome, the suit is immunized under Noerr . . . .”). 
167 See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670 (1965) (“Joint efforts to 
influence public officials do not violate the antitrust laws even though intended to eliminate 
competition.”).  
168 See, e.g., Neil Katsuyama, The Economics of Occupational Licensing: Applying Antitrust Eco-
nomics to Distinguish Between Beneficial and Anticompetitive Professional Licenses, 19 S. CAL. 
INTERDISC. L.J. 565, 569 (2010) (“Most licensing boards were created or are managed by the 
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Notably, the Fourth Circuit recently held a state licensing board accountable 
for its anticompetitive restrictions on dental practice in North Carolina State 
Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC.169 The law here is complicated and in 
flux; thus, a comprehensive treatment of its details is necessary.  
Certainly, licensing restrictions passed directly by a state’s legislature or 
supreme court enjoy state action immunity.170 Most licensing regulations, 
however, become law when promulgated by an administrative board, and the 
Supreme Court has not determined the status of practitioner-dominated 
boards since Midcal. Most board decisions likely meet Midcal’s first prong 
requiring clear articulation from the state, but these decisions are not 
typically subject to the kind of state review that courts have required to find 
active supervision. Thus, immunity turns on whether state licensing boards 
are among the entities that do not have to show supervision.  
Any state mandate calling for the regulation of entry and good standing 
in a profession is likely to meet the Court’s low bar for clear articulation, 
since all licensing restricts competition by reducing the number of competing 
professionals in the field.171 The Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Benson v. Arizona 
State Board of Dental Examiners172 is typical. In considering Sherman Act 
claims challenging a state dental board’s refusal to recognize out-of-state 
licenses, the court easily found the necessary clear articulation in the state’s 
statute giving the Board discretion to adopt reciprocity rules.173 Contrary 
outcomes involve boards acting in violation of state policy. In Goldfarb v. 
 
state, and therefore are beyond the reach of the Sherman Act.”); cf. Einer Richard Elhauge, The 
Scope of Antitrust Process, 104 HARV. L. REV. 667, 693 (1991) (noting the Supreme Court’s 
suggestion that “the active supervision requirement is probably inapplicable to state agencies, a 
suggestion with which the lower courts have virtually all agreed” (footnote omitted)). 
169 717 F.3d 539 (4th Cir. 2013) 
170 See Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 567-68 (1984) (“[W]hen a state legislature adopts 
legislation, its actions constitute those of the State . . . and ipso facto are exempt from the 
operation of the antitrust laws.” (citations omitted)); see also Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover, Inc. v. 
Am. Bar Ass’n, 107 F.3d 1026, 1036 (3d Cir. 1997) (applying state action immunity because the 
states made the ultimate decision whether to adhere to ABA standards); STATE ACTION TASK 
FORCE, supra note 84, at 6 (noting that “actions of a state legislature and of a state supreme court 
acting in a legislative fashion are those of the state acting as sovereign” (footnote omitted)); 
Bobrow, supra note 50, at 1487 (noting that discretion over a law restricting attorney advertising 
was properly left to the state in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977)). 
171 See, e.g., Earles v. State Bd. of Certified Pub. Accountants, 139 F.3d 1033, 1044 (5th Cir. 
1998) (noting that, in establishing a permissive policy with respect to the State Board of Certified 
Public Accountants Board of Louisiana, “the state rejected pure competition . . . in favor of 
establishing a regulatory regime that inevitably has anticompetitive effects”); see also Havighurst, 
supra note 50, at 599 (“Few things are more foreseeable than that a trade or profession empowered 
to regulate itself will produce anticompetitive regulations.”).  
172 673 F.2d 272 (9th Cir. 1982).  
173 Id. at 275. 
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Virginia State Bar, the Supreme Court held that although a state bar associa-
tion was a state agency for the purpose of “investigating and reporting the 
violation” of ethical rules promulgated by the Supreme Court of Virginia,174 
it could not enjoy immunity for its price-fixing because it acted contrary to 
the state’s clearly articulated competition policy.175  
As clear as it is that typical licensing board actions pass Midcal’s first 
prong, it is equally clear that many would fail the second prong—the active-
supervision requirement—if subjected to it. The Supreme Court has 
recognized that the active-supervision requirement is met only when states 
actually “exercise ultimate control over the challenged anticompetitive 
conduct;”176 the Court has overturned schemes where states possessed, but 
never exercised, their authority to review the scheme.177 Even schemes 
where the state provides the final authorization of a restriction can lack 
supervision if the state uses a “negative option” that allows a state’s silence 
to signify approval.178 For most licensing boards, their restrictions become 
operational upon, at most, a rubber stamp from the state. The typical case 
falls short of Ticor’s requirement of an affirmative pronouncement by the 
state signaling that it has “played a substantial role in determining the 
specifics of the economic policy.”179 
Thus, a board’s status under Parker turns on whether it is subject to the 
requirement of supervision at all. In Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, the 
Court found a municipality immune under Parker because it acted pursuant 
 
174 421 U.S. 773, 776 n.2 (1975) (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 54-49 (1972)). 
175 See id. at 790-91 (“[A]nticompetitive activities must be compelled by direction of the State 
acting as a sovereign.”); see also FTC v. Mass. Bd. of Registration in Optometry, 110 F.T.C. 549, 
614 (1988) (refusing to find clear articulation for an optometry board’s onerous advertising 
restrictions in light of contrary statutory language). 
176 Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 101 (1988); see also Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. 
Midcal Aluminum Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 106 (1980) (finding inadequate supervision because the “State 
does not . . . engage in any ‘pointed reexamination’ of the program”). Although decided decades 
before Midcal’s two-step formulation, Parker itself emphasized the fact that the challenged 
restriction did not take effect until approved by the state. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 352 
(1943).  
177 See, e.g., FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 638 (1992) (“The mere potential for 
state supervision is not an adequate substitute for a decision by the State.”).  
178 Id. at 639-40. Likewise, the FTC has held that “silence on the part of the state does not 
equate to supervision.” N.C. Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 151 F.T.C. 607, 632 (2011). 
179 Ticor, 504 U.S. at 635. Boards are typically subject to several mechanisms that improve 
their accountability to the state, such as member disclosure requirements, adherence to state 
administrative procedure acts, and public access to meetings and minutes. See, e.g., N.C. Bd. of 
Dental Exam’rs, 151 F.T.C. at 630-32 (noting the board’s required compliance with “North 
Carolina’s Public Records Act, Administrative Procedure Act, and open meetings law”). But at 
least one lower court has held that these devices are inadequate to establish supervision under 
Midcal’s second prong. See N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 717 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2013). 
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to the state’s clearly articulated policy to displace competition, despite being 
unsupervised.180 The Court reasoned that, for municipalities, supervision is 
unnecessary because there is no “real danger that [it] is acting to further 
[its] own interests, rather than the governmental interests of the State.”181 
Although Hallie did not provide a test for determining which entities, in 
addition to municipalities, are entitled to this fast track to immunity, a 
footnote provided a hint: “In cases in which the actor is a state agency, it is 
likely that active state supervision would also not be required, although we 
do not here decide that issue.”182  
Many lower courts have applied Hallie’s footnote, though dicta, as law.183 
But by and large these courts have not interpreted the footnote to mean that 
all entities with a colorable claim to being a “state agency”—which probably 
includes occupational licensing boards—are automatically exempt from the 
supervision requirement.184 Rather, most lower courts analyze the function, 
composition, and accountability of the entity claiming immunity when 
considering its status under the Hallie footnote.185 The circuits, too, are split 
on this question of how state occupational licensing boards fare under this 
analysis.186 
Some courts have concluded that occupational boards are among the 
“state agencies” to which the Hallie Court was referring, and thus exempted 
them from Midcal’s supervision prong. For example, in Earles v. State Board 
of Certified Public Accountants of Louisiana, the Fifth Circuit declined to apply 
Midcal’s supervision prong to a state board and thus rejected Sherman Act 
claims against it.187 The opinion reasoned that Louisiana’s Board of Certi-
fied Public Accountants “is functionally similar to a municipality” because 
“the public nature of the Board’s actions means that there is little danger of 
a cozy arrangement to restrict competition.”188 Similarly, in Hass v. Oregon 
State Bar, the Ninth Circuit held that the state bar, as an agent of the 
Oregon Supreme Court, “is a public body, akin to a municipality for the 
 
180 471 U.S. 34, 47 (1985). 
181 Id. 
182 Id. at 46 n.10. 
183 Elhauge, supra note 168, at 693. 
184 See 1A PHILIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 225c, at 
160 (3d ed. 2006) (describing state court cases after Hallie); C. Douglas Floyd, Plain Ambiguities in 
the Clear Articulation Requirement for State Action Antitrust Immunity: The Case of State Agencies, 41 
B.C. L. REV. 1059, 1063-64 (2000). 
185 See sources cited supra note 184. 
186 Id. 
187 139 F.3d 1033, 1041 (5th Cir. 1998). 
188 Id. 
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purposes of the state action exemption.” 189 The court cited the board’s three 
(of fifteen) nonlawyer members, public meetings, and open records as 
evidence of the board’s public nature.190 Finding no danger that the bar 
(acting as a state licensing board) was “pursuing interests other than those 
of the state,” the court did not apply the supervision prong.191  
Not all courts have been as comfortable eliding Midcal’s second prong 
when considering action by a state agency, especially when that agency is an 
occupational licensing board. But until last year, the only circuit cases that 
suggested state agencies must pass both prongs did so in dicta, providing 
relatively weak support for potential antitrust plaintiffs. Even now, the only 
circuit decision squarely holding that a state agency must satisfy both 
prongs has some language suggesting that it could have narrow application. 
Before last year’s Fourth Circuit decision, precedent supporting the su-
pervision requirement for licensing boards was weak because the cases at 
most implied that supervision would apply. For example, in FTC v. Mo-
nahan, Judge Breyer (then writing for the First Circuit) rejected a licensing 
board’s claim that state action immunity automatically allowed it to circum-
vent a federal subpoena in an antitrust case.192 The court explained that 
whether the state supervision condition applies “depends upon how the 
Board functions in practice,” which in turn depends on the information 
requested in the subpoena.193 The opinion thus ordered the board to comply 
with the subpoena, but made no holding on the merits of the board’s claim 
that its public nature meant it need not show state supervision to enjoy 
Parker immunity.194 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit, in an opinion that does not 
cite its somewhat contrary opinion in Hass, has observed that a board “may 
not qualify as a state agency” because its “private members have their own 
agenda which may or may not be responsive to state labor policy.”195 As in 
Monahan, the court did not issue a merits opinion after the remand.  
Without an opinion squarely holding a licensing board to antitrust scru-
tiny, case law such as Hass and Earles has caused scholars to assume away the 
possibility of an antitrust suit against a licensing board and to deter litigants 
 
189 883 F.2d 1453, 1460 (9th Cir. 1989). 
190 Id. 
191 Id. at 1459. 
192 832 F.2d 688 (1st Cir. 1987). 
193 Id. at 690. 
194 Id. (“[W]e cannot now say, without knowing more facts, whether or not this additional 
‘state supervision’ condition will apply.”). 
195 Wash. State Elec. Contractors Ass’n, Inc. v. Forrest, 930 F.2d 736, 737 (9th Cir. 1991) 
(emphasis added). 
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from pursuing such suits.196 Even if courts acknowledged that the doctrinal 
question of Parker immunity for occupational boards was technically open,197 
scholars and litigants seem to assume that, as a practical matter, the court-
room door was closed.  
Last year, however, the Fourth Circuit took these holdings out of the 
hypothetical realm and squarely applied Midcal’s second prong to a licensing 
board in North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC.198 The 
decision thus created a circuit split with the Ninth and Fifth Circuits—a 
split that the Supreme Court recently decided to review.199 As we noted 
earlier, the breadth of the Fourth Circuit holding is unclear.200 According to 
the concurrence in the Fourth Circuit, the holding is very narrow; it leaves 
many boards—as presently comprised—immune from suit. Specifically, the 
Fourth Circuit upheld an FTC decision that struck down North Carolina’s 
dentistry board’s claim for immunity based on the board’s failure to show 
adequate supervision.201 In a lengthy opinion, the Commission explained 
that whether an entity must satisfy Midcal’s supervision prong depends not 
on its formal label as a “state agency,” but rather on the “tribunal’s degree of 
confidence that the entity’s decision-making process is sufficiently inde-
pendent from the interests of those being regulated.”202 The Fourth Circuit 
agreed, holding that “when a state agency appears to have the attributes of a 
private actor and is taking actions to benefit its own membership . . . both 
parts of Midcal must be satisfied.”203  
The potential narrowness of the Fourth Circuit holding arises because 
the panel concluded that a board dominated by practitioners elected by 
other industry members fits that description.204 The concurrence contended 
 
196 See, e.g., Havighurst, supra note 50, at 597 (observing that, despite the FTC’s success in a 
case against the Texas State Board of Accountancy, “[t]here were few follow-up cases of this 
kind”). 
197 Some scholars have recognized this doctrinal uncertainty. See, e.g., Bobrow, supra note 50, 
at 1489; Bona, supra note 50, at 42. 
198 717 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2013). 
199 N.C. Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, No. 13-534, 82 U.S.L.W. 3260 (2013), granting cert. to 
N.C. State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 717 F.3d 359. 
200 See supra note 38.  
201 Id. at 375 (“[T]he Board’s status as a group of professionals does not condone its anticom-
petitive practices.”). 
202 N.C. Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 151 F.T.C. 607, 619 (2011). In this respect, the opinion echoes 
the FTC’s State Action Task Force Report, which advocated supervision for organizations where 
members essentially make rules for their own industries. STATE ACTION TASK FORCE, supra 
note 84, at 55. The idea follows from Areeda and Hovenkamp’s argument that “bodies engaged in 
self-regulation of their members’ commercial activities need active supervision by a more public 
body to satisfy the Midcal requirements.” AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 184, ¶ 227, at 208. 
203 N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 717 F.3d at 369 (italics added). 
204 Id. at 370. 
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that practitioner-dominance is not alone sufficient to show that a board is a 
“private actor” in need of state supervision under the rule of the case. The 
case’s holding, according to the concurrence, “turns on the fact that the 
members of the Board, who are market participants, are elected by other 
private participants in the market.”205 Under the concurrence’s reading, 
boards comprised of private competitors appointed by a governor (ubiqui-
tous among licensing boards206) would not be subject to Midcal’s supervision 
prong and therefore would almost always enjoy Parker immunity.  
We argue that the concurrence’s interpretation—which results in a broad 
state action immunity—has a weak foundation under Supreme Court 
precedent or sound public policy, even if several circuit courts might agree. 
A presumption of such a broad state action immunity has, in many circuits, 
relegated plaintiffs to ill-suited constitutional challenges to boards’ anti-
competitive actions.  
2. The Common Route to Challenging State Licensing Restraints:  
Due Process and Equal Protection 
With powerful antitrust immunities in place, the only viable avenue for 
consumers or would-be professionals seeking to challenge the actions of 
state licensing boards is to make a constitutional claim.207 Like all state 
regulation, professional licensing restrictions must not violate the Due 
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Due 
process prevents a state from denying someone his liberty interest in 
professional work if doing so has no rational relation to a legitimate state 
interest. 208  Similarly, equal protection requires that states distinguish 
licensed professionals from those excluded from practice on some rational 
basis related to a legitimate state goal.209 The two analyses typically conflate 
into one question: Did the licensing restriction serve, even indirectly or 
inefficiently, some legitimate state interest?210 
 
205 Id. at 376 (Keenan, J., concurring). 
206 Almost all the licensing boards we surveyed are appointed by the governor. See Appendix.  
207 See Katsuyama, supra note 168, at 567-69 (“The two principle [sic] means through which 
licensing regulations have been challenged are the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause 
and the Sherman Antitrust Act.”). 
208 See generally Anthony B. Sanders, Comment, Exhumation Through Burial: How Challenging 
Casket Regulations Helped Unearth Economic Substantive Due Process in Craigmiles v. Giles, 88 
MINN. L. REV. 668, 671-74 (2004) (explaining economic regulation and modern rational basis 
jurisprudence). 
209 See id. at 674-78 (noting the parallels between economic substantive due process and 
equal protection jurisprudence). 
210 Katsuyama, supra note 168, at 567-69. 
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That burden is easy to meet, as illustrated by the leading Supreme Court 
case on the constitutionality of professional licensing schemes. In William-
son v. Lee Optical, the Supreme Court upheld a state statute preventing 
opticians from fitting patients’ existing lenses in new frames without a 
prescription from an ophthalmologist or optometrist.211  The Williamson 
plaintiffs sued on the theory that the scheme was designed to artificially 
increase demand for optometry services and therefore violated the Due 
Process and Equal Protection Clauses.212 The Court implicitly recognized a 
liberty right under the Due Process Clause to pursue one’s chosen occupa-
tion.213 But since that right is not sufficiently “fundamental” to give rise to 
strict scrutiny214 and because opticians are not a protected class under the 
Equal Protection Clause, both claims were subject only to rationality 
review.215 The Court rejected the plaintiffs’ challenge, making clear that any 
possible justification for the restriction, however thin, was enough.216 Other 
cases have further held that the proffered justification need not have 
actually motivated the legislature to survive rationality review; it may be 
post-hoc and prepared only for litigation.217 
The Supreme Court has only once found an occupational licensing re-
striction to fail rationality review, in Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners of 
New Mexico,218 and then only because an otherwise valid licensing require-
ment was unlawfully applied to an individual. Like most states, New 
 
211 348 U.S. 483, 486 (1955). Although the case considered state legislative activity, subse-
quent cases have clarified that the case’s analysis is applicable to administrative rules promulgated 
by state licensing boards. See, e.g., Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1221 (10th Cir. 2004) (suggest-
ing that “merely a citation to Williamson would have sufficed to dispose of” a case involving a 
statute). 
212 Williamson, 348 U.S. at 484. 
213 Although the Williamson Court did not make this explicit, subsequent cases have articu-
lated this finding. See, e.g., Meadows v. Odom, 360 F. Supp. 2d 811, 813 (M.D. La. 2005), vacated as 
moot, 198 F. App’x 348 (5th Cir. 2006) (“The right to pursue the ‘common occupations of life’ is a 
protected liberty interest, subject to reasonable limitations.” (quoting Blackburn v. City of 
Marshall, 42 F.3d 925, 941 (5th Cir. 1995))). 
214 See Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 223-24 (6th Cir. 2002) (“Although the licensing 
requirement has disrupted the plaintiffs’ businesses, the regulations do not affect any right now 
considered fundamental and thus requiring more significant justification.”). 
215 Williamson, 348 U.S. at 487-88. 
216 Id. It found enough rationality in the fact that “in some cases the directions contained in 
the prescription are essential, if the glasses are to be fitted so as to correct the particular defects of 
vision or alleviate the eye condition.” Id. at 487. Thus the Court upheld the statute even though it 
conceded that “[t]he Oklahoma law may exact a needless, wasteful requirement in many cases.” Id. 
217 See, e.g., Clark Neily, No Such Thing: Litigating Under the Rational Basis Test, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. 
& LIBERTY 898, 905-07 (2005) (explaining that actual reasons are irrelevant because legislatures 
need not articulate reasons for statutes). 
218 353 U.S. 232 (1957). 
  
2014] Cartels by Another Name 1129 
 
Mexico requires attorneys to exhibit good moral character in order to sit for 
the bar exam. In Schware, the Court found a rational basis for such a 
requirement on its face, but it held that the New Mexico Supreme Court 
did not have a rational justification for denying a former communist 
permission to sit for the exam.219 Because of its politically charged subject 
matter, Schware has largely been limited to its facts. In any case, it expressly 
approved of a state’s ability to require its bar applicants to possess a quality 
as subjective as “good moral character.”220 
In applying Schware to the activity of state licensing boards, lower courts 
have found even extremely thin justifications for anticompetitive licensing 
restrictions to suffice for rationality review. In Meadows v. Odom, a Louisiana 
district court accepted the state board’s contention that licensing florists 
helped promote health and safety by decreasing the risk of pricks by wires 
in haphazardly arranged bouquets.221 Similarly, a California district court 
upheld the California Structural Pest Control Board’s requirement that 
exterminators of rats, mice, and pigeons—but not those of skunks and 
squirrels—obtain a state license.222  
One circuit has even held that insulating professionals from competition 
is itself a legitimate state interest, making matters even more difficult for 
plaintiffs alleging harm to competition. The Tenth Circuit in Powers v. 
Harris distinguished intrastate protectionism, which it considered constitu-
tionally permissible, from interstate protectionism, which it acknowledged 
was illegitimate under the Dormant Commerce Clause.223  
Contrary holdings are rare. The Sixth Circuit gave the campaign to 
invalidate anticompetitive state licensing on constitutional grounds224 its 
 
219 Id. at 238. 
220 Id. at 239. 
221 360 F. Supp. 2d 811, 823-24 (M.D. La. 2005), vacated, 198 F. App’x 348 (5th Cir. 2006). 
The court quoted the testimony of a retail florist, testifying as an expert, to support the assertion 
that licensing florists reflected the state’s “concern for the safety and protection of the general 
public.” Id. at 824. The florist testified, “I believe that the retail florist does protect people from 
injury . . . . We’re very diligent about not having an exposed pick, not having a broken 
wire, . . . and I think that because of this training, that prevents the public from having any 
injury.” Id.  
222 Merrifield v. Lockyer, 388 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1058-61 (N.D. Cal. 2005), aff ’d in part, rev’d in 
part, 547 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2008). It was enough to pass rationality review that the covered pests 
were more commonly found inside structures than the noncovered pests, suggesting that they were 
a more natural target for regulation. Id. at 1058. Although the holding was reversed on appeal, the 
case illustrates that some courts find even very weak justifications colorable. 
223 379 F.3d 1208, 1219 (10th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 920 (2005).  
224 Institute for Justice, a public interest law firm, is at the forefront of this movement, and 
many of the cases cited in this section were argued by their attorneys. See IJ Cases, INST. FOR 
JUSTICE, http://www.ij.org/cases (last visited Mar. 22, 2014). 
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most significant victory in Craigmiles v. Giles.225 Using reasoning that was 
explicitly rejected in Powers, the Craigmiles court invalidated Tennessee’s 
restriction on unlicensed casket sales.226 The court was unusually skeptical 
about the justifications advanced by the state board, which argued that 
shoddy caskets presented a public health risk.227 The court found that only 
one justification did not reek with “the force of a five-week-old, unrefriger-
ated fish”228: the scheme would allow funeral directors to collect monopolis-
tic profits in selling coffins.229 Unlike the Powers court, the Sixth Circuit 
deemed such economic protectionism “illegitimate” and invalidated the 
restrictions because they failed even “the slight review required by rational 
basis review.”230  
Powers’ condemnation of interstate protectionism suggests that the 
Dormant Commerce Clause may be an alternative means of attacking the 
constitutionality of occupational licensing restrictions.231 Yet cases brought 
on this theory have failed. Most states do not recognize occupational licenses 
from other states, and plaintiffs have argued that such “nonreciprocity” 
violates the dormant commerce clause by discriminating against out-of-state 
commerce in favor of in-state interests. But courts have rejected this claim, 
explaining that states have a legitimate interest in applying their own 
particular requirements to professionals. 232  “Nonreciprocity” licensing 
schemes pass rationality review as long as they apply the same licensing 
requirements to in-state and out-of-state applicants. 
 
225 312 F.3d 220 (6th Cir. 2002). 
226 Id. at 229. 
227 Id. at 225-26. 
228 Id. at 225 (citation omitted). 
229 Id. at 228. The court noted that the restriction allowed funeral homes to “mark up the 
price of caskets 250 to 600 percent.” Id. at 224. 
230 Id. at 228-29. 
231 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Federalism and Antitrust Reform, 40 U.S.F. L. REV. 627, 646 
(2006) (“[O]ne can imagine egregious situations in which the impact of state regulation falls 
almost entirely on out-of-state interests, but then it seems the dormant Commerce Clause would 
be sufficient to handle the problem.”). 
232 See, e.g., Locke v. Shore, 634 F.3d 1185, 1197 (11th Cir. 2011) (finding Florida’s interior 
design license requirement constitutional); Kirkpatrick v. Shaw, 70 F.3d 100, 104 (11th Cir. 1995) 
(finding Florida Bar rules constitutional); Scariano v. Justices of the Supreme Court of the State 
of Ind., 38 F.3d 920, 928 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding Indiana’s waiver of bar exam requirements for 
select out-of-state applicants constitutional). 
  
2014] Cartels by Another Name 1131 
 
III. THE NORMATIVE CASE: WHY SHERMAN ACT LIABILITY  
FOR STATE LICENSING BOARDS IS A GOOD IDEA 
State action immunity for occupational licensing boards is an anachro-
nism with an ever-increasing price tag as more professionals and more 
services come under board authority. Constitutional suits have done little to 
solve the problem. This Part makes the normative case for lifting antitrust 
immunity for state licensing boards. It begins by illustrating the close fit 
between the harms that the Sherman Act sought to combat and the economic 
harm from heavy-handed licensing regulation. We argue that it is antitrust 
law, not constitutional law, that provides the most logical and effective 
mechanism to evaluate the costs and benefits of occupational licensure.  
We then contend that the principal argument against broadening Sherman 
Act liability—that it disrupts the balance of power between the states and 
the federal government—is especially unpersuasive in the licensing context. 
As the scholarly debate flowing from Midcal reveals, concerns for federalism 
are at their peak when federal laws displace state regulations enacted by a 
locally accountable government with constituent participation. This does 
not describe restrictions created by practitioner-dominated licensing boards.  
A. Antitrust Liability for Professional Licensing: An  
Economic Standard for Economic Harm 
The Sherman Act—famously called “the Magna Carta of free enter-
prise”233—protects competition as a way to maximize consumer welfare. 
According to courts and economists alike, competition is harmed when 
competitors restrict entry or adhere to agreements that suppress incentives 
to compete. When these kinds of restrictions are naked and horizontal, 
liability attaches per se, but even when they are not, competitors must prove 
that they provide a net benefit to consumers in order to pass muster under 
the rule of reason.234 At bottom, both the per se rule and the rule of reason 
ask a single question: Is competition (and therefore are consumers) harmed 
or helped by this activity? Because this test, unlike rationality review under 
the Constitution, best safeguards consumer welfare, it should be used to 
evaluate occupational licensing restrictions. 
 
233 United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972). 
234 See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 885 (2007) (“In its 
design and function the rule [of reason] distinguishes between restraints with anticompetitive 
effect that are harmful to the consumer and restraints stimulating competition that are in the 
consumer’s best interest.”). 
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1. Sherman Act Policy and the Competitive Harm of Licensing:  
A Close Fit 
Without the veneer of “professional licensing,” some board restrictions 
epitomize the evil at which modern antitrust policy is aimed. Like all 
agreements between competitors, licensing schemes can be used for compet-
itive good or competitive evil. The normative question in both traditional 
cartel cases and licensing contexts should be the same: Does the combina-
tion, on net, improve consumer welfare?235 To ensure that this important 
question is asked and answered in the licensing context, antitrust law and its 
tools for balancing pro- and anticompetitive effects should be brought to 
bear on licensing schemes.  
This close fit between the Sherman Act’s intended target and the eco-
nomic harm of excessive licensing can be seen in the functional equivalence 
of the restrictions promulgated by occupational boards and the business 
practices held unlawful under § 1. To cut hair legally in Tennessee, a 
candidate must pass a test—designed by her would-be competitors—
proving she can file and polish nails.236 But when a gas burner manufacturer 
was denied approval by a private standard-setting association that used a 
test influenced by his competitors and “not based on objective standards,” 
the Supreme Court found Sherman Act liability appropriate.237 Similarly, 
the Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct prohibit attorneys from advertising 
their prices using words such as “cut rate,” “discount,” or “lowest.”238 But 
when similar restrictions on price advertising are imposed by private 
associations of competitors, rather than as a licensing requirement, they are 
per se illegal.239 Additionally, all lawyers must prove their “good moral 
standing” to join a state bar.240 But when a multiple listing service (a private 
 
235 Cf. Timothy Sandefur, Equality of Opportunity in the Regulatory Age: Why Yesterday’s Ration-
ality Review Isn’t Enough, 24 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 457, 484-85 (2003–2004) (“If the government 
must protect consumers from the ill effects of monopolies, then monopolistic practices by 
government licensing agencies should also be prohibited. The potential victims are the same 
(consumers); the potential injury is the same (unreasonable prices); and the potential wrongdoers 
are the same (monopolistic producers).”). 
236 See TENN. CODE. ANN. §§ 62-4-102; 62-4-110; 62-4-111 (West 2009) (requiring appli-
cants for a cosmetologist’s license to prove that they have passed a course of instruction in practice 
and theory at a school of cosmetology). 
237 Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656, 658, 660 (1961). 
238 OHIO RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.1 cmt. 4. 
239 See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 184, ¶225c, at 160 (discussing such cases).  
240 For more information on bar qualifications, see NAT’L CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAM’RS & 
AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSION TO THE BAR, COMPREHENSIVE 
GUIDE TO BAR ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS (2014), available at http://www.ncbex.org/ 
assets/media_files/Comp-Guide/CompGuide.pdf.  
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entity not created by the state) comprised of competing real estate agents 
tried to impose a “favorable business reputation” requirement on its mem-
bers, a court found the requirement to violate the rule of reason because the 
standard was vague and subjective.241 The requirement failed Sherman Act 
scrutiny because it gave the listing service the power to exclude competitors 
in arbitrary and anticompetitive ways.242 
Sometimes the match between a licensing restriction and an unlawful 
private restriction on trade is more analogical than literal, but the anticom-
petitive risk is the same. For example, nonrecognition of out-of-state 
licenses subdivides the national market for services and insulates profes-
sionals in one state from competitors in another. Market allocation, which 
has a comparable economic effect, is per se illegal under § 1 of the Sherman 
Act when agreed to by private competitors. Similarly, when a licensing 
board dominated by practitioners tightly controls the standards of profes-
sional practice, it acts as a standard-setting association passing judgment on 
its competitor’s products. In both contexts, there is potential for consumer 
benefit and opportunistic self-dealing, but only private standard-setting 
associations are subjected to antitrust scrutiny.243 
Thus, licensing schemes can be similar to cartel agreements in substance, 
which alone may justify antitrust liability. But making matters even worse 
for consumers, licensing schemes come in a particularly durable form. 
Licensing boards, by their very nature, face few of the cartel problems that 
naturally erode price and output agreements between competitors. By 
centralizing decisionmaking in a board and endowing it with rulemaking 
authority through majority voting, professional competitors overcome the 
hurdle of agreement that ordinarily inhibits cartel formation. Cheating is 
prevented by imposing legal and often criminal sanctions—backed by the 
police power of the state—on professionals who break the rules.244 Finally, 
most cartels must fend off new market entrants from outside the cartel that 
hope to steal a portion of its monopoly rents. For licensed professionals, 
licensing deters entry and ensures that all professionals (at least those 
practicing legally) are held to its restrictions.  
 
241 United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351, 1376 (5th Cir. 1980). 
242 Id. at 1385-86. 
243 13 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 2230, at 430 (3d ed. 2012); cf. C-O-
Two Fire Equip. Co. v. United States, 197 F.2d 489, 493-94 (9th Cir. 1952) (finding that the jury 
could reasonably infer that the defendant corporations were maintaining noncompetitive prices in 
order to sell to both dealers and the public), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 892 (1952). 
244 Ninety-five percent of Florida licensing boards and seventy-six percent of Tennessee 
boards are backed up by criminal sanctions. See Appendix.  
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We highlight the similarities between cartel activity and licensing re-
strictions to suggest that licensing is a natural target for regulation under 
the Sherman Act. But just because both kinds of restrictions can be held to 
antitrust scrutiny does not mean that the outcome of that analysis will (or 
should) be the same. As we explain in detail in Part IV, per se condemna-
tion of most board activity is inappropriate. And, under our proposed 
modification to the rule of reason, some restrictions—restrictions that 
would be condemned if used by a private cartel—will be approved. The 
point here is that if excessive licensing threatens competition, then it should 
be held to a standard designed to address competitive harm. Modern 
antitrust law provides just that standard. 
2. Constitutional Suits and Their Limited Ability to  
Protect Consumers 
Constitutional suits alone cannot curtail the anticompetitive effects of 
professional licensing for two reasons. First, and perhaps most important, 
they are almost impossible to win.245 Second, successful challenges vindicate 
an individual’s right to work, not a consumer’s right to low prices driven 
down by robust competition.246 It is a happy coincidence that these interests 
are often tethered. But because the constitutional question is framed as a 
struggle between the individual and the state, the standard—rational basis—
requires no direct inquiry into competitive effects. Therefore, it is antitrust 
law, not constitutional law, that can directly address the economic evils of 
licensing by requiring restrictions to be economically reasonable. And it is 
the rule of reason, not rationality review, that can balance pro- and anti-
competitive effects of a restriction and ensure that only the efficient survive.  
Suits challenging state licensing restrictions on constitutional grounds 
are rarely successful because plaintiffs must overcome powerful presump-
tions in favor of the state. In the professional licensing context, “the 
demands of rational basis review are not impossible to overcome, but they 
are extraordinarily high.”247 A law for which “there is any conceivable state 
of facts that could provide a rational basis” will survive constitutional 
challenge; 248  even the flimsiest justification will do. The legitimizing 
 
245 See supra subsection II.B.2. 
246 See, e.g., McCormack, supra note 92, at 457 (asserting that the Supreme Court has created 
a right to livelihood and suggesting that it should be used as the basis for due process challenges to 
regulation). 
247 Sanders, supra note 208, at 692. 
248 FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993). 
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rationale may be post hoc, unsupported by facts or evidence,249 or even 
supplied by the judge himself250 if the state fails to articulate a sufficient 
rational basis in its brief. As one judge puts it, rational basis scrutiny 
“invites us to cup our hands over our eyes and then imagine if there could 
be anything right with the statute.”251 With so many ways to validate a 
statute, plaintiffs are forced “to prove a negative—a nearly impossible 
task.”252 
When constitutional suits are successful, the right vindicated is that of 
the individual against the government, not the right of the consumer against 
a self-dealing industry. Sometimes these interests are aligned; robust 
protection for an individual’s right to work means more competitors in the 
profession, which in turn could mean lower prices for consumers. But 
scholars have framed the campaign to invoke constitutional rights against 
heavy-handed professional regulation as a revival of the right to liveli-
hood,253 not as a consumer-welfare movement. Thus, courts hearing consti-
tutional challenges to licensing schemes are confronted with arguments 
about what kinds of economic activity a state may regulate in the first place, 
not arguments about whether the benefits of licensing outweigh its costs. 
When the dispute is framed as a question about when states can legitimately 
use their police power for economic regulation, courts can invoke the 
specter of Lochner254 to justify a hands-off approach.  
Nowhere is it more apparent that constitutional law and antitrust law 
serve different purposes than in Powers v. Harris. In that case, the Tenth 
Circuit upheld a licensing restriction as rationally related to Oklahoma’s 
“legitimate state interest” in insulating incumbent professionals from 
competition.255 The court noted that “while baseball may be the national 
 
249 Neily, supra note 217, at 905-07 (providing examples of regulations upheld merely because 
a legislature does not have to articulate any reason or factual basis for adopting it). 
250 Lana Harfoush, Grave Consequences for Economic Liberty: The Funeral Industry’s Protectionist 
Occupational Licensing Scheme, The Circuit Split, and Why It Matters, 5 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEUR-
SHIP & L. 135, 153 (2011) (noting that plaintiffs must anticipate not only rationales “stated in the 
regulation, or . . . stated in the legislative records, but also whatever the judge may think of 
while on the bench”). 
251 Arceneaux v. Treen, 671 F.2d 128, 136 n.3 (5th Cir. 1982) (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
252 Sandefur, supra note 235, at 500 & n.234 (illustrating the difficult challenge that plaintiffs 
face). 
253 See, e.g., McCormack, supra note 92, at 404 (pointing out that the right of livelihood does 
not fit within the normal construction of constitutional principles because it does not involve “the 
political relation of the individual to government”). 
254 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (holding that New York could not legitimately 
exercise its state police power to limit the number of hours that a baker could work each day and 
week). 
255 Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1222-23 (10th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 920 (2005). 
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pastime of the citizenry, dishing out special economic benefits to certain in-
state industries remains the favored pastime of state and local govern-
ments.”256  Although other circuits have held otherwise,257  the Supreme 
Court refused to grant certiorari to resolve the circuit split, leaving the 
Tenth Circuit’s holding as one possible interpretation of “legitimate state 
interest.” This interpretation eviscerates constitutional law’s ability to 
safeguard robust competition and its benefits to consumer welfare.  
B. Antitrust Federalism: Its Modern Justifications and Applicability to  
Sherman Act Liability for Licensing Boards 
The most serious argument against Sherman Act liability for state licensing 
boards is that it would upset the balance between state and federal power 
struck in Parker and its progeny. As discussed above, the doctrinal question 
is technically unsettled, even if most courts and commentators take for 
granted that boards are immune under Parker.258 That doctrinal uncertainty 
raises a normative question: Should boards enjoy state action immunity? In 
this Section, we argue that they should not.  
We reveal the normative foundation of antitrust federalism by surveying 
the Midcal case law and the voluminous scholarship interpreting it. Alt-
hough the various accounts differ in other ways, they all agree that self-
dealing, unaccountable decisionmakers should face antitrust liability. We 
argue that state licensing boards fall squarely in this category when a 
majority of members are competitors subject to or benefitting from the 
boards’ rules. Therefore, all practitioner-dominated boards should be subject 
to Midcal’s supervision requirement, regardless of who selects their members. 
1. The Parker Debate: Accountability Is Key 
Over a dozen Supreme Court cases since Parker have wrestled with de-
fining exactly who, and what kind of conduct, enjoys antitrust immunity.259 
Likewise, much ink has been spilled in law reviews over the normative 
commitments behind the Court’s handwringing. Do we require state 
supervision because without it, federalism, the underlying justification for 
 
256 Id. at 1221. 
257 See, e.g., Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 224 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that “protecting a 
discrete interest group from economic competition is not a legitimate government purpose”). 
258 See supra subsection II.B.1.c. 
259 For a listing of the cases decided after Midcal, see supra note 157. The cases decided between 
Parker and Midcal include City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978); Bates v. 
State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976); and 
Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).  
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immunity, is not implicated? Or do we require supervision because we trust 
governments (but not private entities) to restrict competition only as 
necessary to serve the public interest? Since Parker, both commentators and 
courts have rejected pure comity justifications for antitrust federalism.  
Instead, the law reserves state action immunity for bodies whose struc-
tures and processes ensure they act in the public interest. In other words, 
political accountability is the price a state must pay for antitrust immunity.260 
So held the Court in FTC v. Ticor Title Insurance Co., explaining that 
“[s]tates must accept political responsibility for actions they intend to 
undertake” by active supervision.261 The Court further emphasized state 
accountability: “Federalism serves to assign political responsibility, not to 
obscure it.”262 
The scholarship interpreting Midcal echoes this sentiment. Three of the 
most cited commentators from the debate are William Page, John Shepard 
Wiley, Jr., and Einer Elhauge. Each wrote within a decade after Midcal, and 
all called for reforms to the state action doctrine that would more effectively 
sort captured regulation from politically legitimate regulation. Each pro-
posed a different theory and disagreed with the others in significant ways, 
but all three would deny immunity for licensing boards—at least as they 
operate presently.  
In the year following Midcal, Page applauded the clear articulation 
requirement as protection against industry self-dealing through state agency 
capture.263 If a state wanted to enjoy federal antitrust immunity, it had to 
make a clear statement—through an elected and politically accountable 
body—expressing a policy in conflict with the Sherman Act.264 To Page, 
these legislative statements assured “valid popular consent” for anticompetitive 
regulations, even if an unelected agency or committee subsequently hashed 
out the details.265  
 
260 See Havighurst, supra note 50, at 591 (“The active-supervision requirement . . . may 
also embody a federal expectation that any state that denies consumers the benefits of competition 
must provide some alternative protection for their interests.”). 
261 504 U.S. 621, 636 (1992). 
262 Id. 
263 See William H. Page, Antitrust, Federalism, and the Regulatory Process: A Reconstruction and 
Critique of the State Action Exemption After Midcal Aluminum, 61 B.U. L. REV. 1099, 1125 (1981) 
(noting that the clear articulation requirement enables courts and regulated firms to “predict 
accurately whether their activities are exempt”). 
264 Id. at 1122. 
265 Id. at 1117. 
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Five years later, Wiley took an opposing view in criticizing Midcal,266 
but like Page, assumed that an essential ingredient of antitrust federalism is 
public participation.267 Wiley’s proposal allows Sherman Act scrutiny when 
state restrictions result from producer capture, implying that federal 
antitrust law should bow to state regulation only when that regulation is at 
least minimally responsive to the public.268  
Elhauge disagreed with the framing of the Midcal debate, both by the 
Supreme Court (in post-Midcal cases such as 324 Liquor Corporation v. 
Duffy269 and Fisher v. City of Berkeley270) and by commentators like Page and 
Wiley, precisely because it obscured the role that politically unaccountable 
self-dealing played in antitrust federalism.271 He argued against what he 
called the “conflict paradigm”—in which state action immunity is perceived 
as a battle between federal interest in free markets and state interest in 
protectionism—in favor of his “more straightforward approach” of simply 
asking whether “under the [state’s] statutory scheme, the person controlling 
the terms of the restraint . . . was financially interested.”272 Thus, Elhauge’s 
vision of antitrust federalism overlaps with Page’s and Wiley’s where it sees 
local political legitimacy—to Elhauge, financial disinterest—as a prerequi-
site to immunity.273  
 
266 John Shepard Wiley Jr., A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 HARV. L. REV. 713, 
715, 729 (1986).  
267 Id. at 731-32. 
268 Id. at 788-89. 
269 479 U.S. 335 (1987). 
270 475 U.S. 260 (1986). 
271 Elhauge, supra note 168, at 674-78. 
272 Id. at 685. 
273 Many other scholars have argued that separating politically accountable decisionmaking 
from self-dealing should be the main goal of the state action test. See, e.g., Merrick B. Garland, 
Antitrust and Federalism: A Response to Professor Wiley, 96 YALE L.J. 1291, 1294 (1987) (stating that 
the underlying rationale of the state action exemption is “respect for the decisions for elected local 
governments”); Hovenkamp, supra note 231, at 633 (arguing that “antitrust need not countenance 
restraints in which the effective decision makers are the market participants themselves”); Robert 
P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Making Sense of the Antitrust State-Action Doctrine: Balancing 
Political Participation and Economic Efficiency in Regulatory Federalism, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1203, 1253 
(1997) (concluding that regulations are immune from antitrust scrutiny “provided those regulations 
were decided by an open, participatory political process”); Thomas M. Jorde, Antitrust and the New 
State Action Doctrine: A Return to Deferential Economic Federalism, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 227, 249-50 
(1987) (highlighting the importance of opportunities for public participation); David McGowan & 
Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust Immunity: State Action and Federalism, Petitioning and the First Amendment, 
17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 293, 332 (1994) (“Arguments about state action and petitioning 
immunity ultimately converge on substantive ideas of democracy and democratic values.”); Jim 
Rossi, Political Bargaining and Judicial Intervention in Constitutional and Antitrust Federalism, 83 
WASH. U. L.Q. 521, 561 (2005) (“State-action immunity, implied from the Sherman Act, affords 
immunity for purposes of promoting federalism—valued because of the democratic legitimacy it 
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When the FTC published its State Action Task Force Report in 2003, it 
adopted what had become the consensus view: antitrust federalism is 
defensible only when a state could be held accountable for an anticompeti-
tive restriction.274 According to the report, state action immunity exists to 
exempt laws and regulations that are attractive to voters because they 
restrict competition that harms some market participants but simultaneously 
benefits the public.275 Immunity is necessary because nearly all government 
action changes the competitive environment and creates some market losers. 
However, the FTC report recognized that meaningful voter support is 
necessary to justify immunity.276 Unless the decisions of private actors are 
properly supervised by political actors subject to election, the support 
justifying immunity is lacking.  
2. State Licensing Boards: Self-Interested and Unaccountable  
Consortiums of Competitors 
The scholarly perspectives on Parker and Midcal suggest that state action 
immunity is not appropriate where the temptation of self-dealing is espe-
cially high and the potential for holding officials accountable especially low. 
For state licensing boards, both conditions hold, resulting in absurd 
licensing restrictions. First, those most hurt by excessive professional 
restrictions—consumers—are particularly ill-represented in the political 
process of licensure. Second, and most important, occupational licensing is 
currently left up to members of the profession themselves. When Parker is 
used to protect the efforts of incumbent professionals to restrict entry into 
their markets, it creates the very situation Midcal warned against—it casts a 
“gauzy cloak of state involvement over what is essentially a private price-
fixing arrangement.”277 
Public participation in state board activity is very low because the typi-
cal state board is comprised of appointed professionals, not consumers or 
 
affords, not because state decisions in and of themselves are sacrosanct.”); Matthew L. Spitzer, 
Antitrust Federalism and Rational Choice Political Economy: A Critique of Capture Theory, 61 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 1293, 1312 (1988) (criticizing Wiley’s state action test as unjustified because it does not 
“proffer[] an appealing theory of democratic legitimacy”). 
274 STATE ACTION TASK FORCE, supra note 84, at 14 (discussing scholarship and recent 
Supreme Court case law addressing the active-supervision requirement). 
275 Id. at 1. 
276  Id. at 54 (“Through the active supervision requirement, the Court . . . ensur[es] 
that . . . the state’s legislators will not be ‘insulated from the electoral ramifications of their 
decisions.’”) (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1992)). 
277 Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 106 (1980). 
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other public members.278 While most states’ sunshine laws require publica-
tion of minutes and require that board meetings be open to the public, only 
members typically attend.279 Individual consumers lack the incentive to 
participate in the process of licensing regulation; rarely would it be rational 
for a consumer to take the time and effort to try to change a licensing rule 
in the hopes of getting a cheaper haircut. Lobbying groups could theoreti-
cally fill this void by aggregating consumer interests, but public choice 
theory illustrates that meaningful consumer participation in the political 
process is difficult even with this mechanism.280 The most motivated public 
participants are the practitioners at the margins of the regulated professions 
hoping for entry.281 As discussed above, the incentives of would-be profes-
sionals are sometimes aligned with those of consumers—but not always.282 
Second, as our study of boards in Florida and Tennessee suggests, most 
state licensing boards are dominated by practitioners in the field.283 On one 
hand, practitioner dominance is inevitable. Tailoring restrictions to benefit 
the public (namely, encouraging competent practice) usually requires 
experience in the profession. Laypersons are generally unable to make 
judgments about the quality and risks of professional service; indeed, that is 
how licensing boards justify their actions. But the need for expertise creates 
a problem: those who have the most to gain from reduced consumer welfare 
in the form of higher prices are tasked with protecting consumer welfare in 
the form of health and safety—the fox guards the henhouse. 
The most influential accounts of antitrust immunity would exclude prac-
titioner-dominated boards from Parker protection. In his straightforward 
process-based account of state action, Elhauge recognized the anticompeti-
tive inevitability of self-regulation.284 His normative vision of antitrust 
federalism, modest compared to Wiley’s and Page’s in its call to expose state 
regulation to antitrust liability, would deny immunity to entities whose 
 
278 Nominees are often selected from lists provided by regulated professional groups them-
selves. Havighurst, supra note 50, at 596. Some boards are comprised of members elected directly 
by members of the profession. See, e.g., N.C. Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 151 F.T.C. 607, 626 (2011) 
(“[T]he six dentist members of the Board are elected directly by their professional colleagues, the 
other licensed dentists in North Carolina.”).  
279 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 286.011 (West 2012) (requiring open meetings and publica-
tion of minutes); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 8-44-102, 8-44-104 (West 2012) (same). 
280 See Ginevra Bruzzone, Deregulation of Structurally Competitive Services: Economic Analysis 
and Competition Advocacy, in THE ANTICOMPETITIVE IMPACT OF REGULATION 5, 21 
(Giuliano Amato & Laraine L. Laudati eds., 2001). 
281 Cf. Kleiner, supra note 2, at 197 (discussing barriers to entry). 
282 See supra Section II.A. 
283 See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text and Appendix. 
284 Elhauge, supra note 168, at 668 (“[T]he effect and intent of state and local regulation is 
generally to restrain competition.”). 
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members stand to profit financially from anticompetitive regulation.285 This 
would certainly describe the typical practitioner-dominated licensing board. 
As Elhauge observes, “[A]ntitrust stands for the . . . limited proposition 
that those who stand to profit financially from restraints of trade cannot be 
trusted to determine which restraints are in the public interest and which 
are not.”286 
If state licensing fails Elhauge’s test for immunity, then it must also fail 
under Wiley’s and Page’s broader definitions of illegitimate capture. Cap-
ture is often subtle and debatable. Some would argue that the Federal 
Reserve Board is captured by Wall Street because so many of its members 
come from or go to Wall Street banks, or because banks have so much access 
to the Federal Reserve that Federal Reserve board members begin to think 
like bankers. Whether the Federal Reserve is captured in these senses 
depends on where one draws the line between enough and too much 
regulatory access. In the case of occupational licensing, however, this line-
drawing is not a problem. By dint of their membership, boards are literally 
and explicitly captured: practitioners enjoy a majority—often a supermajority—
among the decisionmakers.287 Licensing boards are born captured.288 
Cases that exempt state licensing boards from Midcal’s supervision 
prong (such as Hass and Earles) are wrong because they fail to recognize this 
basic feature of board decisionmaking. These cases analogize licensing 
boards to municipalities because boards are “public,” citing open meetings, 
public-minded mandates, and an affiliation with the state.289 The cases, 
however, fail to recognize that these features cannot meaningfully check 
self-dealing in the way that elections and public visibility check municipal 
officers from self-dealing at the expense of their constituents. These cases 
are also inconsistent with Bates, where the state bar of Arizona was treated 
as a private actor requiring state supervision to claim state action immunity 
for its actions.  
 
285 Id. at 671. 
286 Id. at 672. 
287 Here we have, to use Wiley’s terminology, direct evidence of capture. He suggests that 
judges should “demand . . . plaintiffs . . . identify producers who profit from the regulation’s 
competitive restraint and who played a decisive political role in its adoption.” Wiley, supra note 
266, at 769.  
288 In Tennessee and Florida, for example, the legislation creating the boards makes the vast 
majority of boards majority-dominated by participants in the regulated industry. See Appendix.  
289 See, e.g., Earles v. State Bd. of Certified Pub. Accountants, 139 F.3d 1033, 1041 (5th Cir. 
1998) (“[T]he public nature of the Board’s actions means that there is little danger of a cozy 
arrangement to restrict competition.”).  
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A more searching, case-by-case approach—such as the one the FTC ad-
vocated in North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners290—would look to the 
actual accountability of the board to determine when there is “an apprecia-
ble risk that the challenged conduct may be the product of parties pursuing 
their own interests rather than state policy.”291 The FTC, echoing Elhauge’s 
argument, would find that such risk is present whenever the entity “con-
sist[s] in whole or in part of market participants,”292 and certainly where the 
entity is dominated by market participants. We agree.  
Such an entity differs significantly from the municipality in Hallie. The 
Hallie Court found that when a municipality regulates, “there is little or no 
danger that it is involved in a private price-fixing arrangement.”293 Although 
the Court does not provide reasoning for this conclusion, it is easily sup-
plied. A municipality makes decisions through elected officials and civil 
servants. These decisionmakers are charged with maximizing the public 
good294 and—although only a very antiquated view of government would 
hold that the officials’ self-interest is irrelevant—their subjugation to the 
electorate achieves the level of accountability and democratic legitimacy 
that we require to grant immunity.  
The flaw of Hallie’s footnote ten is its failure to articulate why state 
agencies and municipalities are so similar that “there is little or no dan-
ger”295 of self-dealing in both.296 There is a diversity of state agencies, and it 
may be reasonable to presume that those not dominated by competitors or 
captured by the regulated industry do in fact pursue the state’s governmen-
tal interest. 297 But, the mere fact that a legislature declares a body to be a 
state agency as the legislature in North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners 
did, cannot itself eliminate the “real danger that [the board] is acting to 
further [members’] own interests, rather than the governmental interests of 
 
290 151 F.T.C. 607, 618 (2011). 
291 STATE ACTION TASK FORCE, supra note 84, at 15. 
292 Id. at 55. 
293 Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 47 (1985). 
294 See Steven Semeraro, Demystifying Antitrust State Action Doctrine, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 203, 282 (2000) (explaining that the state action doctrine “posit[s] a social structure in 
which government actors are supposed to act in the public interest”). 
295 Hallie, 471 U.S. at 47. 
296 Bobrow, supra note 50, at 1500 (listing key differences between state agencies and munici-
palities). 
297 As the FTC has noted, “Whatever the case may be with respect to state agencies general-
ly . . . the Court has been explicit in applying the antitrust laws to public/private hybrid entities, 
such as regulatory bodies consisting of market participants.” N.C. Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 151 
F.T.C. 607, 619 (2011). Clark Havighurst has also advocated for a case-by-case analysis of state 
agencies. See Havighurst, supra note 50, at 598 (“[C]ourts applying the state action doctrine should 
shape their inquiries to give proper weight to federal antitrust concerns as well as federalism.”). 
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the State,” which the Hallie Court viewed as the reason private actors must 
be state supervised to escape antitrust review.298 Who could seriously argue 
that an unsupervised group of competitors appointed to regulate their own 
profession can be counted on to neglect their selfish interests in favor of the 
state’s?299 That would require blindness to Adam Smith’s observation that 
“[p]eople of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and 
diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in 
some contrivance to raise prices.”300  
The Fourth Circuit’s analysis in North Carolina State Board of Dental 
Examiners dilutes the importance of a competitor-dominated board of 
dentists’s self-interest by conflating that self-interest with the self-interest 
of the dentists who elect the board.301 Self-interest does not compound like 
other interest; the self-interest of the board is enough to require supervi-
sion. The notion that governor appointment can meaningfully solve the 
problem of self-dealing is also unrealistic. Indeed, all influential accounts 
of antitrust federalism, from Wiley’s focus on capture302 to Elhague’s focus 
on financial self-interest,303 focus on the identity of the decisionmakers, not 
their means of appointment. A narrow reading of North Carolina Board of 
Dental Examiners’s holding would allow governors—however well-
intentioned they may be in the appointment process—to hand the controls 
of regulation over to the regulated themselves and walk away without any 
oversight responsibility. 
Sound public policy requires that any consortium of competitors be 
supervised by disinterested state agents, be subject to antitrust laws, or 
both. That the consortium of competitors is called a state board and given 
power by the state to regulate its profession does not make it more trust-
worthy. The grant simply makes the board more powerful and therefore 
more dangerous. Supervision by disinterested state agents should be a 
minimum requirement for a state board to receive antitrust immunity under 
Hallie and Midcal, Hallie’s footnote notwithstanding. If true independence is 
impossible, which is arguably the case in the licensing context given that 
industry expertise is essential to decisionmaking, there is even greater need 
for active supervision to justify immunity. Common sense tells us that 
 
298 Hallie, 471 U.S. at 47. 
299 See Havighurst, supra note 50, at 596-99 (noting that the composition of state licensing 
boards qualifies them as “more professional than governmental in character”).  
300 SMITH, supra note 100, at 134. 
301 717 F.3d 359, 366-70 (4th Cir. 2013) (“[W]hen a state agency is operated by market partic-
ipants who are elected by other market participants, it is a ‘private’ actor.”).  
302 Wiley, supra note 266. 
303 Elhauge, supra note 168. 
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competition law cannot abdicate control when a powerful consortium of 
competitors regulates its own industry, even if the state has granted them 
power to do so. Thus, the Supreme Court should use the circuit split as an 
opportunity to embrace the Fourth Circuit’s holding in North Carolina State 
Board of Dental Examiners—but then go further by clarifying that all practi-
tioner-dominated boards are subject to both Midcal prongs, regardless of the 
appointment process. 
In one sense, such a holding would be modest because it would not call 
into question vast amounts of state law; many areas of state regulation are 
not delegated to majority-industry boards, or at least are actively supervised 
by the state itself. The California Department of Insurance, for example, 
has an elected politician as its current head—one who never worked in the 
insurance industry.304 Likewise, many state agencies are largely comprised 
of civil servants and have only nominal participation from industry mem-
bers. But in another sense the change would be significant. Most licensing 
boards would fail the supervision prong if subjected to it; requiring state 
supervision for licensing boards that claim state action immunity creates the 
potential for sweeping changes to regulations affecting over a third of the 
nation’s workforce.  
IV. THE MECHANICS OF ANTITRUST LIABILITY FOR  
STATE LICENSING BOARDS 
Since our proposal would put thousands of boards under the Sherman 
Act’s microscope, we dedicate the last Part of this Article to describing the 
logistics of such a regime. Section A outlines how Sherman Act suits against 
professional boards might proceed. Since boards resemble private profes-
sional associations in their composition and incentives and the parties 
involved parallel those in a traditional § 1 suit, we borrow the mechanics of 
suits under that provision. This Section also recommends modifying the 
rule of reason in the licensing context to a standard that allows as procom-
petitive arguments gains to public safety and quality of service, even when 
these gains flow directly from limitations on competition. We then address 
questions related to standing and the single-entity doctrine. Section B 
predicts how states might react and evaluates the competitive consequences 
of those reactions.  
 
304 About Us: About the Commissioner, CAL. DEP’T INS. (Oct. 2, 2013), http://www.insurance.ca.gov/ 
0500-about-us/0200-commissioner. 
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A. Imagining a New Regime 
Some rules, such as the traditional rule of reason, should be altered to 
accommodate arguments unique to licensing. But other doctrines, such as 
standing, treble damages, and the single-entity defense, translate well into 
the licensing context. 
1. The Standard: Rule of Reason as Applied to Licensing 
The basic rule of § 1 is the rule of reason. Under this rule, and since 
Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, only unreasonable restraints 
of trade are illegal.305 Restraints without acceptable justification (or whose 
justifications are too implausible) are either held per se illegal or illegal 
under a quick-look rule of reason.306 The full-blown rule of reason ferrets 
out the good and the bad to determine if a restraint is justified. 
The full-blown rule of reason is used for “agreements whose competitive 
effect can only be evaluated by analyzing the facts peculiar to the business, 
the history of the restraint, and the reasons why it was imposed.”307 The 
central question under a § 1 rule-of-reason analysis is whether a restraint 
will tend to substantially limit competition. Justice Brandeis formulated the 
test as “whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and 
perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress 
or even destroy competition.”308 Modern courts frame the question as one 
of balancing pro- and anticompetitive effects of the restraint.309 
However, not all benefits are considered “procompetitive” under the rule 
of reason. In perhaps the strongest condemnation of social-welfare justifica-
tions, the Supreme Court in National Society of Professional Engineers v. 
United States rejected a professional society’s rule hindering comparison 
price-shopping for engineering services. 310  The engineers argued that 
“awarding engineering contracts to the lowest bidder, regardless of quality, 
would be dangerous to the public health, safety, and welfare.”311 The Court 
called the engineers’ attempt to so justify the restraint “nothing less than a 
 
305 221 U.S. 1, 66 (1911) (discussing the rule of reason).  
306 See, e.g., Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978) (describing 
the “two complementary categories of antitrust analysis”). 
307 Id. at 692. 
308 Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). 
309 See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 59 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“The plaintiff 
must demonstrate that the anticompetitive harm of the conduct outweighs the procompetitive 
benefit.”). 
310 435 U.S. 679. 
311 Id. at 685. 
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frontal assault on the basic policy of the Sherman Act.”312 In particular, 
public safety benefits that flow directly from a reduction of competition do 
not escape scrutiny because “the statutory policy precludes inquiry into the 
question whether competition is good or bad.”313 Under a conventional rule-
of-reason analysis, a permissible agreement must directly enhance competi-
tion in some way, such as when a group of copyright holders creates a new 
and valuable product together.314 Of course, the most plausible benefits of 
many (and perhaps most) licensing restraints flow directly from their 
limitations on competition. Curing the lemons problem or eliminating 
externalities, therefore, might not be seen as procompetitive under the 
Professional Engineers holding. 
The basic policy justifications for licensing boards flow from the belief 
that free and unfettered competition will lower the quality of service 
provided to the public.315 Under Professional Engineers, such justifications 
might not be viewed as procompetitive and therefore might be held illegal. 
This, we think, would be a step too far.  
The argument that boards protect the public from charlatans is not in-
herently implausible and deserves respect. We therefore advocate a modified 
rule of reason that would allow licensing boards to cite public safety and 
quality enhancement justifications even when those alleged benefits flow 
directly from eliminating or limiting competition. When courts balance the 
competitive effects of a licensing restriction, they should place service 
quality and public safety benefits on the procompetitive side of the scale.  
Modifying the rule of reason to incorporate public health and safety 
arguments may not actually be as large of a shift in doctrine as it may 
appear at first glance. Although courts often purport to find public interest 
justifications irrelevant to a § 1 analysis, this rejection is neither universal 
nor complete. Courts have been willing to consider appeals to health and 
safety, especially in the context of reviewing restrictions imposed by 
professional associations.  
For example, even in Professional Engineers, the Court acknowledged that 
Goldfarb, which it had decided just three years earlier, “noted that certain 
practices by members of a learned profession might survive scrutiny under 
 
312 Id. at 695. 
313 Id. 
314 See Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1979) (holding 
that the issuance of blanket licenses to copyrighted musical compositions at negotiated fees does 
not constitute price fixing).  
315 For a discussion of why licensing boards would likely pass rational basis review, see supra 
subsection II.B.2. 
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the Rule of Reason even though they would be viewed as a violation of the 
Sherman Act in another context.”316  
Lower courts have used this mixed message from the Supreme Court to 
find a place for social welfare justifications in rule-of-reason analysis. For 
example, in United States v. Brown University, the Third Circuit remanded a 
suit challenging an agreement among elite universities about financial aid 
packages.317 The court required the district court to undertake a full-blown 
rule-of-reason analysis and place “social welfare justifications”—which the 
lower court had previously rejected—on the procompetitive side of the 
scale.318 The court said that proper rule-of-reason analysis would consider 
the benefits of making higher education available to the “needy” and of 
having a more diverse student body at the elite schools.319 The court ex-
plained that the financial aid agreement in place among the schools “may in 
fact merely regulate competition in order to enhance it, while also deriving 
certain social benefits,” and noted that such an agreement would survive 
Sherman Act scrutiny.320 
Brown University may occupy the outer boundary of a court’s willingness 
to entertain social welfare justifications for agreements restricting competi-
tion, but even the Supreme Court has softened its hard line against these 
arguments. In a decision that paralleled that in Brown University, California 
Dental Association v. FTC remanded a challenge against a dental association’s 
advertising ban that failed the lower court’s quick-look rule of reason 
analysis.321 By calling for a less-abbreviated analysis of the restraint, the 
Court implied that the association’s defenses of the ban—that it promoted 
quality of care and information by restricting one dimension of competi-
tion—were legitimate under the Sherman Act.322  
California Dental and Brown University set a foundation for the proper 
standard for Sherman Act analysis of licensing board restrictions. As 
discussed in Part II, unregulated markets for professional services can harm 
social welfare in two ways. Offering consumers a choice between low-
quality, low-price services and high-quality, high-cost services is inefficient 
because consumers choosing the low-quality option will not fully internalize 
 
316 Professional Engineers, 435 U.S. at 686. 
317 5 F.3d 658 (3d Cir. 1993). 
318 Id. at 678. 
319 Id. at 677-78. 
320 Id. at 677. 
321 526 U.S. 756 (1999). 
322 Id. at 779-81 (suggesting that there is “generally no categorical line to be drawn between 
restraints that give rise to an intuitively obvious inference of anticompetitive effect and those that 
call for more detailed treatment”). 
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its costs (the externalities problem). Furthermore, even if a full range of 
quality were socially desirable, information asymmetries would cause the 
market for high-quality services to unravel (the lemons problem). If licens-
ing works to remedy these market failures, then the average or minimum 
quality of service will be higher than under an unlicensed regime.  
To solve these problems, courts should apply a modified rule-of-reason 
analysis in licensing cases as follows. First, courts should accept arguments 
that a restriction improves consumer access to information or raises quality 
of service as procompetitive justifications. Measuring quality of service is 
difficult, especially when it is impossible to observe a market unfettered by 
licensing. But the difficulty of quantifying competitive benefits is nothing 
new in rule-of-reason cases. Professional boards should be induced to bring 
their best evidence of procompetitive effects to the suit. Second, claims of 
quality improvement should be specific and tied to a theory of market 
failure that justifies government interference. 323  In other words, for a 
licensing restriction to pass muster under the rule of reason, it should 
closely fit the problem it is designed to solve. Finally, courts should consider 
whether other regulations could restore information symmetry or raise 
quality of service with less cost to competition. Put another way, courts 
should consider whether there are less restrictive alternatives to the chal-
lenged licensing scheme.  
This three-prong system for analyzing a licensing restriction—
identifying a legitimate reason for the licensing restriction, analyzing the fit 
between the restriction and the problem, and inquiring into less restrictive 
alternatives—resembles the constitutional standard applied to equal protec-
tion or due process claims. But it can also be understood as a framework for 
the balancing that the traditional rule of reason demands. Under the first 
two prongs, a court places the benefits of restriction on the procompetitive 
side of the scale. Under the last prong, the court places the restriction’s 
competitive burden on the anticompetitive side of the scale, asking whether 
there is an alternative less destructive to competition that achieves the same 
benefits.  
Revisiting the specific examples discussed above will illustrate the kinds 
of arguments that will be persuasive to a court analyzing a state board’s 
restriction under our modified rule of reason. Louisiana’s rule forbidding 
casket sales by anyone other than a licensed funeral director would fail the 
 
323 This recommendation is similar to one of Wiley’s requirements for lifting state action 
immunity where the regulation does not “respond[] directly to a substantial market efficiency.” 
Wiley, supra note 266, at 743.  
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first prong of the test. There is no empirical evidence that caskets are of 
poor quality or that consumers cannot determine the value of a casket in 
states without such a restriction. Further, the state would have difficulty 
raising even a theoretical argument that inferior-quality caskets present a 
public health and safety issue because it does not even require burial by 
casket at all. Nor could it easily argue that the free market for caskets would 
suffer from information asymmetries given that one can comparison shop 
for caskets on websites like Amazon.com, which offers consumer reviews, 
detailed specifications, and photographs.324 Therefore, the restriction fails 
the first prong because it fails to address any significant market failure—in 
practice or theory. 
Restrictions on nurse practitioners would also fail the first prong, but 
not because there are no theoretical failures in an unregulated market for 
medicine. In theory, low-quality healthcare creates externalities when the 
cost of fixing (or living with) bad outcomes falls on other individuals or the 
government. This is almost certainly the case in our system, in which the 
effects of poor care are felt everywhere, from emergency rooms and inner-
city clinics to schools and the workplace. But despite the strong theoretical 
argument that any given regulation on a nurse’s right to practice improves 
quality and therefore addresses a market failure, there is no empirical 
evidence that supervised nurses have better outcomes than unsupervised 
ones.325 Thus, licensing restrictions that require nurse practitioners to be 
supervised would fail the first prong for lack of data suggesting that such 
restrictions improve the quality of care. 
State cosmetology boards’ attempts to bring African hair braiding under 
their jurisdiction, on the other hand, would fail the second prong of our 
modified rule-of-reason analysis. Whatever health and safety issues arise 
from the unlicensed practice of braiding, they are not addressed by requiring 
practitioners to attend up to 1800 hours of schooling on the use of chemi-
cals, dyes, and other beauty techniques that do not relate to African hair 
braiding. There is simply a poor fit between the restriction and the problem 
that it purportedly addresses. Similarly, a state restriction requiring a 
cosmetology license for brow threaders would fail the second prong, as 
would requiring a degree in veterinary medicine for horse teeth floaters 
when veterinary schools teach nothing about the practice.326 
 
324 Amazon.com lawfully sells caskets online to customers living in states without regulations 
similar to Louisiana’s. 
325 See CHRISTIAN & DOWER, supra note 21, at 6. 
326 See Challenging Barriers to Economic Opportunity, supra note 58. 
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If a restriction survives the first two prongs, the court should balance the 
benefit of the restriction against its cost to competition. For example, some 
regulation of horse teeth floating may be justifiable since horse owners may 
not be able to evaluate the quality of a floater’s service. In that case, the 
third prong would be the crucial factor: making teeth floaters attend 
veterinary school is an outsized requirement. Rather, a state might be able 
to justify a less restrictive licensing requirement that is specific to horse 
teeth floaters and mandates a short educational unit followed by a test 
narrowly tailored to assessing competency in teeth floating. 
In balancing the anticompetitive effects of the restriction, courts should 
also consider other governmental regulations that are less restrictive than 
licensing. For example, labor economists hail certification as a superior 
option to licensing where a free market may suffer from information 
asymmetry.327 Certification is similar to licensing in that the state sets 
educational or testing criteria for professionals; passing these hurdles 
signals to consumers the individual’s minimum quality and competency. But 
unlike under licensing schemes, uncertified practitioners may still practice 
as long as they do not claim a “certified” title. Certification thus solves the 
information asymmetry problem because consumers seeking higher-quality 
services can pay more for certified practitioners. But it does so at a lower 
cost to competition, since certification is not an absolute barrier to entry for 
low-cost practitioners. Accordingly, Louisiana’s restriction on unlicensed 
flower arranging would likely fail the third prong of the test. Since market 
failure in the flower industry is at most information asymmetry, not exter-
nalities, offering state certification programs to florists could easily address 
the problem.  
2. The Parties: Standing to Sue and Available Damages 
Changing the state action regime for licensing boards raises several lo-
gistical questions. Who would sue? What would be the remedy? And would 
board members pay damages? As a descriptive matter, the answers are 
relatively easy: lifting state action immunity for state boards means that the 
parties who sue and are sued would be the same as in a run-of-the-mill § 1 
case.328 Government enforcement agencies such as the DOJ and the FTC, 
 
327 KLEINER, supra note 3, at 152-57 (identifying certification and registration as policy alter-
natives); Michael Pertschuk, Needs and Licenses (noting that certification is one alternative that 
provides information without creating a barrier to entry), in OCCUPATIONAL LICENSURE AND 
REGULATION, supra note 97, at 347. 
328 Of course, under the Eleventh Amendment, federal courts could not entertain suits 
against the boards as “arms” of the state. But under the holding of Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 
  
  
2014] Cartels by Another Name 1151 
 
as well as private individuals capable of proving antitrust injury, could bring 
suit against the conspirators (here, members of an industry serving on a 
board) seeking equitable and monetary relief. But this analogy leads to an 
important normative question: Does this regime create incentives that 
ensure optimal enforcement of antitrust norms? This subsection argues that, 
for the most part, it does.  
Since anticompetitive licensing restrictions often further local state in-
terests, federal enforcement will be essential to police self-dealing. The DOJ 
and the FTC will be able to bring suits based on the claim that a given 
licensing regulation violates the Sherman Act. Without the bar of state 
action immunity, the agencies will also be able to seek equitable relief under 
§ 4 of the Sherman Act329 and § 15 of the Clayton Act330 to invalidate and 
prevent a board from implementing an anticompetitive regulation. Federal 
agencies will bring the knowledge, expertise, and resources for empirical 
investigations necessary to identify anticompetitive targets.331  
That said, licensing boards and private cartels should be treated differ-
ently under criminal law despite their many similarities. Just as the poten-
tial benefits of licensing make per se condemnation inappropriate, they 
should also preclude criminal prosecution. State licensing board activity, 
while full of anticompetitive potential, is hardly among the hard-core 
violations that serve as the primary target for criminal enforcement. 
Lifting the state action ban on suits against boards will also allow private 
individuals capable of showing antitrust injury to bring suit. These plain-
tiffs, like other antitrust plaintiffs, can be divided into two categories: 
consumers and competitors. Although consumers of a professional service 
may not have enough financial incentive to bring a suit individually, they 
could use class action suits to aggregate damages to a litigable amount. And 
§ 15 of the Clayton Act, of course, strengthens the incentive to sue by 
providing plaintiffs with treble damages.332  
 
(1908), individual board members could be sued in federal court in their official capacities. See 
Earles v. State Bd. of Certified Pub. Accountants, 139 F.3d 1033, 1039-41 (5th Cir. 1998) (noting 
that the Ex parte Young rule has been viewed as allowing a federal court to entertain suits against 
individual officials). 
329 15 U.S.C. § 3 (2012). 
330 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2012). 
331 In fact, even without the added incentive created by the power to bring suits, the FTC 
has invested in numerous studies of the economic impact of professional regulation. See, e.g., COX 
& FOSTER, supra note 23, at 31 (summarizing the percentage increase in prices due to business-
practice restrictions); LIANG & OGUR, supra note 20, at 44-47 (providing empirical results on 
dental restrictions). 
332 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2012). 
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Similarly, competitors—most likely would-be professionals—could sue 
to receive three times the wages they would have earned but for the anti-
competitive barrier to entry. These wages may be difficult to prove but not 
necessarily more difficult to prove than lost earnings caused by cartel 
activity. Would-be professionals could also use the Sherman Act as a shield 
rather than a sword; lifting Sherman Act immunity would mean that would-
be professionals could defend against a board’s enforcement action by 
invoking the invalidity of the board’s regulation.333  
If lifting state action immunity would allow competitors and consumers 
to sue for monetary damages, who would pay? In cartel cases, the industry 
members who conspire must financially compensate their victims. So, too, 
should be the case in licensing board suits: the industry members on the 
board would be liable for treble damages to competitors and consumers 
harmed by their agreement.334 This is the result under current law when 
courts deny professional associations state action immunity; Goldfarb v. 
Virginia is an example.335 
Individual financial liability for board members may seem like an unjust 
or unworkable regime, but § 1983 imposes similar liability on individual 
state actors for violations of constitutional rights.336 States have responded 
to the prospect of financial ruin for their employees by indemnifying them 
against § 1983 suits as a term of employment.337 With the deeper pockets of 
 
333 The Supreme Court used state action doctrine to reject such a defense in Bates v. State 
Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 359 (1977). In Bates, lawyers who advertised their services in 
contravention of the Bar’s rules argued that the rule was invalid under the Sherman Act. Id. at 354-
56. But the Sherman Act challenge failed on state action grounds because the Arizona rules against 
lawyer advertising “‘reflect[ed] a clear articulation of the State’s policy with regard to professional 
behavior’ and were ‘subject to pointed reexamination by the policymaker—the Arizona Supreme 
Court—in enforcement proceedings.’” Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 
U.S. 97, 105 (1980) (alteration in original) (quoting Bates, 433 U.S. at 362). 
334 John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, State Action and the Meaning of Agreement Under the 
Sherman Act: An Approach to Hybrid Restraints, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 269, 292 (2003) (“[A]ny hybrid 
restraint that violates the antitrust laws and fails the tests for immunity leaves private parties 
exposed to the whole panoply of antitrust remedies.”). 
335 The plaintiffs in Goldfarb, a class of consumers of legal services, sued the state bar associa-
tion for Sherman Act violations. The Supreme Court, in holding that the Bar acted in contraven-
tion of state policy—and therefore without adequate state delegation—remanded the case to allow 
the class to hold individual members of the Bar liable for treble damages. Goldfarb v. Va. State 
Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 791 (1975). 
336 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) (providing a private right of action for money damages to com-
pensate victims of constitutional violations). 
337 In the case of law enforcement, the state or local government that employs the officer 
typically promises to indemnify him in the case of a § 1983 suit. See, e.g., Jonathan Day & Jeffrey 
W. Jacobs, Opening the Deep Pocket—Sovereign Immunity Under Section 1983, 31 BAYLOR L. REV. 
389, 408 (1979) (“[V]oluntary assumption of employees’ liability by governmental entities . . . ha[s] 
already been adopted in most jurisdictions, at least to the extent of assuming the burden of 
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the government available, victims have a meaningful opportunity for 
compensation. Moreover, even though individual employees may not be 
personally liable, the indemnification structure gives states the incentive to 
train employees, tightly control conduct, and create disciplinary systems to 
deter violations.338 States might choose to adopt a similar indemnification 
structure for individual board members in case of a treble damages suit 
under the Sherman Act.  
3. The Defense: Boards as Single Entities? 
Board activity easily fulfills the § 1 requirement of agreement because 
board members meet face-to-face and explicitly agree on licensing 
restrictions, often by formal majority vote. Again, these agreements are 
among competitors; licensing boards often have only nominal representa-
tion from nonprofessionals. Boards may argue, however, that their rules and 
restrictions are not the products of conspiracies because they operate as 
single entities. Conspiring with others on the board, so the argument would 
go, is like conspiring with oneself. 
This argument is likely to fail. The Supreme Court has held that profes-
sional associations, similar to boards in composition and incentives, can be 
conspiracies under § 1. Recently, the Supreme Court rejected the National 
Football League’s argument that individual teams could not conspire with 
one another since they had a single economic incentive to maximize profits 
from licensing team merchandise and ticket sales.339 The Court held that 
the teams, absent the agreement, would have had individual profit incen-
tives to compete with one another, so the agreement “deprives the market-
place of independent centers of decisionmaking” in violation of § 1.340 To 
the extent that there was a unitary financial goal among the teams, it was to 
suppress competition among themselves.341  
Although the Supreme Court has not considered whether a state licens-
ing board is a single entity under § 1, the FTC has rejected this defense to 
Sherman Act liability on several occasions. In FTC v. Massachusetts Board of 
 
defending civil rights claims.”); Alexandra White Dunahoe, Revisiting the Cost-Benefit Calculus of the 
Misbehaving Prosecutor: Deterrence Economics and Transitory Prosecutors, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. 
L. 45, 63-64 & n.83 (2005). 
338 But see generally Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allo-
cation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345 (2000) (arguing that governments do not 
internalize costs in the same way that private firms do). 
339 Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2207 (2010). 
340 Id. at 2212 (citation omitted). 
341 Id. at 2213 (“[I]llegal restraints often are in the common interests of the parties to the 
restraint, at the expense of those who are not parties.”). 
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Registration in Optometry, the FTC explained that the optometry board was 
not acting as a single entity in passing advertising restrictions: “Each 
optometrist on the Board is principally engaged in the private practice of 
optometry in the market that the Board regulates . . . . [I]n the absence 
of those regulations, the Board optometrists would compete with each other 
by individually deciding whether to advertise.”342 Similarly, federal courts 
and the Supreme Court have held that private professional organizations, in 
promulgating standards of practice, certification, and licensing, cannot claim 
to be acting as a single entity under the antitrust laws.343 
B. Possible State Responses and Their Likely Effects 
Applying Sherman Act pressure to state licensing boards will alter the 
equilibrium of a complex system of regulation, so a thorough analysis of its 
benefits must also consider how that system will likely adjust. As this 
Section illustrates, states wishing to regulate professions without having to 
answer to an antitrust suit will have several options. Each option will 
require a departure from the current practice of using practitioner-
dominated administrative boards to promulgate rules and regulations—and 
thus a step toward politically accountable, procompetitive regulation.  
1. Actively Supervising Board Activity 
If the Court requires occupational boards to show supervision in order 
to enjoy immunity from antitrust suits, then the most straightforward way 
for states to insulate boards from antitrust scrutiny is to actively supervise 
them. Supervision, at least in theory, will complete the link between a 
board’s anticompetitive restrictions and the accountable, elected body that 
 
342 110 F.T.C. 549, 582 (1988). Likewise, after the NFL case, the FTC held that the single- 
entity defense was not available to the North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners for the same 
reason. The FTC explained that since board members “stand to reap economic gains when the 
Board takes actions to exclude non-dentists from competing to provide certain services,” it could 
not be said to be acting to further a financial goal independent of those of the individual members. 
N.C. Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 151 F.T.C. 607, 628-29 (2011). 
343 See, e.g., Daniel v. Am. Bd. of Emergency Med., 802 F. Supp. 912, 924-25 (W.D.N.Y. 
1992) (holding that a private certification association can be a § 1 conspiracy); PHILLIP E. 
AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1477 (3d ed. 2006) (“Trade associa-
tions are routinely treated as continuing conspiracies or ‘combinations’ of their members, as are 
bodies promulgating rules or standards for the competitive conduct of their members, such as the 
National Society of Professional Engineers. The most significant attribute of trade associations 
dictating that conclusion is that the individual members continue to have business separate from 
the association itself.” (footnote omitted)). 
  
2014] Cartels by Another Name 1155 
 
demanded them.344 Formal review and approval by the state will afford 
consumers and would-be professionals a stronger voice against heavy-
handed restrictions since they could vote out officials approving unjustifia-
ble regulations.  
Although consumer interests will likely always be more diffuse than 
those of practitioners, forcing states to answer for and stand behind a 
board’s restrictions exposes these decisions to at least some political ac-
countability. As the Court explained in Ticor, “For States which do choose 
to displace the free market with regulation . . . insistence on real compli-
ance with both parts of the Midcal test will serve to make clear that the 
State is responsible for the price fixing it has sanctioned and undertaken to 
control.”345 
2. Changing Board Composition 
Another way in which a state could protect a licensing board from anti- 
trust scrutiny would be to change its composition. A state could limit a 
board’s exposure to antitrust liability by reducing practitioner representa-
tion and filling the rest of the board seats with members representing other 
interests. Having a diverse membership that includes consumers, civil 
servants, labor economists, and members from adjoining professions may 
serve as a prophylactic against liability. Such a board’s decisions are more 
likely to have considered and resolved the concerns of the antitrust laws. 
3. Moving Licensing to the Interior of State Government 
States may, however, find cutting professional participation to token 
levels or implementing costly mechanisms for supervision unattractive. An 
alternative would be to directly regulate through sovereign branches of the 
state itself. Even under the current regime, some professional entry and 
practice requirements are passed as state statutes, and these acts of sovereign 
authority are always immune under Parker.346 Such decisions would not be 
subject to antitrust scrutiny, even under the change proposed in this Article.  
 
344 See, e.g., Inman & Rubinfeld, supra note 273, at 1257 (concluding that Midcal’s supervision 
prong “gives meaning to the first [prong], for without supervision, interested individuals cannot be 
assured that their initial participation in the political process will be meaningful.”). But see 
Havighurst, supra note 50, at 599 (disagreeing with the federal antitrust agencies’ apparent belief 
that “giving greater weight to the active-supervision requirement is the best way to discourage 
state licensing and regulatory boards from acting in anticompetitive ways”). 
345 FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 636 (1992). 
346 See Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 567-68 (1984) (“[U]nder the Court’s rationale in 
Parker, when a state legislature adopts legislation, its actions constitute those of the State, and ipso 
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This change, like adding meaningful state supervision over board activity, 
would facilitate competition by deterring regulation that benefits only 
practitioners. Elected officials would be made to answer for and stand 
behind decisions restricting entry and practice. Restrictions would be 
proposed and debated openly in the legislature, allowing for more participa-
tion from the constituents currently absent from professional licensing 
boardrooms. Requiring that the state place its imprimatur on regulation is 
at least better than the status quo, in which states too often delegate self-
regulation to professionals and walk away. 
CONCLUSION 
Licensed occupations have been free to act like cartels for too long without 
Sherman Act scrutiny. With nearly a third of workers subject to licensing 
and a continuing upward trend, it is time for a remedy. We do not propose 
an end to licensing or a return to a Dickensian world of charlatan healers 
and self-trained dentists. But the risks of unregulated professional practice 
cannot be used to rationalize unfettered self-regulation by the professionals 
themselves. The law needs to strike a balance.  
That balance is the same one sought in any modern rule of reason case: a 
workable tradeoff between a restriction’s salutary effects on the market and 
its harm to competition. Immunity from the Sherman Act on state action 
grounds is not justified under antitrust federalism when those doing the 
regulation are the competitors themselves, where they are not accountable 
to the body politic, where they have too often abused the privilege, and 
where the anticompetitive dangers are so clear. The threat of Sherman Act 
liability can provide the necessary incentives to occupational regulators 
trading off competition for public safety and welfare. Without it, self-
dealing occupational boards will continue to be cartels by another name. 
	  
 
facto are exempt from the operation of the antitrust laws . . . . [A] state supreme court, when 
acting in a legislative capacity, occupies the same position as that of the state legislature.” (citation 
omitted)). 
  
2014] Cartels by Another Name 1157 
 
	 	
APPENDIX: FLORIDA 
 
 
 
Occupational Board 
Statutory 
Citation 
Majority 
Licensed 
Professionals 
Appointing 
Body 
Rulemaking 
Authority 
Criminal 
Enforcement 
Board of 
Acupuncture 
§ 457.101  
et seq. 
Yes Governor Yes Yes 
Board of Athletic 
Training 
§ 468.70   
et seq. 
Yes Governor Yes Yes 
Board of 
Chiropractic 
Medicine 
§ 460.401 
et seq. 
Yes Governor Yes Yes 
Board of Clinical 
Laboratory 
Personnel 
§ 483.800 
et seq. 
Yes Governor Yes Yes 
Board of Clinical 
Social Work, 
Marriage and 
Family Therapy, 
and Mental Health 
Counseling 
§ 491.002 
et seq. 
Yes Governor Yes Yes 
Board of Dentistry 
§ 466.001 
et seq. 
Yes Governor Yes Yes 
Board of Hearing 
Aid Specialists 
§ 484.0401 
et seq. 
Yes Governor Yes Yes 
Board of Massage 
Therapy 
§ 480.031 
et seq. 
Yes Governor Yes Yes 
Advisory Council of 
Medical Physicists 
(under authority of 
Department of 
Health) 
§ 483.901 
et seq. 
No 
FL Surgeon 
General 
No Yes 
Board of Medicine 
§ 458.301 
et seq. 
Yes Governor Yes Yes 
     (continued) 
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Board of Nursing 
§ 464.001 
et seq. 
Yes Governor Yes Yes 
Board of Nursing 
Home 
Administrators 
§ 468.1635 
et seq. 
No Governor Yes Yes 
Board of 
Occupational 
Therapy Practice 
§ 468.201 
et seq. 
Yes Governor Yes Yes 
Board of Opticianry 
§ 484.001 
et seq. 
Yes Governor Yes Yes 
Board of Optometry 
§ 463.0001 
et seq. 
Yes Governor Yes Yes 
Board of Orthotists 
and Prosthetists 
§ 468.80 
 et seq. 
Yes Governor Yes Yes 
Board of 
Osteopathic 
Medicine 
§ 459.001 
et seq. 
Yes Governor Yes Yes 
Board of Pharmacy 
§ 465.001 
 et seq. 
Yes Governor Yes Yes 
Board of Physical 
Therapy Practice 
§ 486.011 
et seq. 
Yes Governor Yes Yes 
Board of Podiatric 
Medicine 
§ 461.001 
et seq. 
Yes Governor Yes Yes 
Board of Psychology 
§ 490.001 
et seq. 
Yes Governor Yes Yes 
Board of 
Respiratory Care 
§ 468.35   
et seq. 
Yes Governor Yes Yes 
Board of Speech-
Language Pathology 
& Audiology 
§ 468.1105 
et seq. 
Yes Governor Yes Yes 
Board of 
Architecture and 
Interior Design 
§ 481.201 
et seq. 
Yes Governor Yes Yes 
     (continued) 
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Board of 
Auctioneers 
§ 468.381 
et seq. 
Yes Governor Yes Yes 
Barbers' Board 
§ 476.014 
et seq. 
Yes Governor Yes No 
Building Code 
Administrators and 
Inspectors Board 
§ 468.601 
et seq. 
Yes Governor Yes Yes 
Regulatory Council 
of Community 
Association 
Managers 
§ 468.431 
et seq. 
Yes Governor Yes Yes 
Construction 
Industry Licensing 
Board 
§ 489.101 
et seq. 
Yes Governor Yes Yes 
Board of 
Cosmetology 
§ 477.011  
et seq. 
Yes Governor Yes No 
Electrical 
Contractors’ 
Licensing Board 
§ 489.501 
et seq. 
Yes Governor Yes Yes 
Board of Employee 
Leasing Companies 
§ 468.520 
et seq. 
Yes Governor Yes Yes 
Board of Landscape 
Architecture 
§ 481.301 
et seq. 
Yes Governor Yes Yes 
Board of Pilot 
Commissioners 
§ 310.001 
et seq. 
No Governor Yes Yes 
Board of 
Professional 
Geologists 
§ 492.101 
et seq. 
Yes Governor Yes Yes 
Board of Veterinary 
Medicine 
§ 474.201 
et seq. 
Yes Governor Yes Yes 
Board of 
Professional 
Engineers 
§ 471.001  
et seq. 
Yes Governor Yes Yes 
     (continued) 
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Board of Funeral, 
Cemetery, and 
Consumer Services 
§ 497.001 
et seq. 
Yes Governor Yes Yes 
Board of 
Professional 
Surveyors and 
Mappers 
§ 472.001 
 et seq. 
Yes 
Commissioner 
of Agriculture 
Yes Yes 
Board of 
Accountancy 
§ 473.301 
et seq. 
Yes Governor Yes Yes 
Real Estate 
Commission 
§ 475.001 
et seq. 
Yes Governor Yes Yes 
Total Boards: 41 90% 98% 95% 
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APPENDIX: TENNESSEE 
 
Occupational Board 
Statutory 
Citation 
Majority 
Licensed 
Professionals 
Appointing 
Body 
Rulemaking 
Authority 
Criminal 
Enforcement 
Board of Accountancy 
§ 62-1-101 
et seq. 
Yes Governor Yes Yes 
Board of Examiners 
for Architectural and 
Engineering 
Examiners 
§ 62-2-201 
et seq. 
Yes Governor Yes Yes 
Board of Barber 
Examiners 
§ 62-3-101 
et seq. 
Yes Governor Yes Yes 
Board of 
Cosmetology 
§ 62-4-101 
et seq. 
Yes Governor Yes Yes 
Board of Funeral 
Directors and 
Embalmers 
§ 62-5-201 
et seq. 
Yes Governor Yes Yes 
Board for Licensing 
Contractors 
§ 62-6-101 
et seq. 
Yes Governor Yes Yes 
Real Estate 
Commission 
§ 62-13-201 
et seq. 
Yes Governor Yes Yes 
Board of Examiners 
for Land Surveyors 
§ 62-18-101 
et seq. 
Yes Governor Yes Yes 
Auctioneer 
Commission 
§ 62-19-101 
et seq. 
Yes Governor Yes Yes 
Collection Service 
Board 
§ 62-20-101 
et seq. 
No Governor Yes Yes 
Private Investigation 
and Polygraph 
Commission 
§ 62-26-301 
et seq. 
Yes Governor Yes Yes 
     (continued) 
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Board for Licensing 
Alarm System 
Contractors 
§ 62-32-301 
et seq. 
Yes Governor Yes Yes 
Real Estate 
Appraiser 
Commission 
§ 62-39-201 
et seq. 
Yes Governor Yes Yes 
Motor Vehicle 
Commission 
§ 55-17-103 
et seq. 
Yes Governor Yes Yes 
Soil Scientist 
Advisory Committee 
(under authority of 
Commissioner of 
Commerce and 
Insurance) 
§ 62-18-201 
et seq. 
Yes 
Commissioner 
of Commerce 
& Insurance 
No No 
Geology Advisory 
Committee (under 
authority of 
Commissioner of 
Commerce and 
Insurance) 
§ 62-36-101 
et seq. 
Yes 
Commissioner 
of Commerce 
& Insurance 
No No 
Home Inspectors 
Advisory Committee  
(under authority of 
Commissioner of 
Commerce and 
Insurance) 
§ 62-6-301 
et seq. 
Yes 
Commissioner 
of Commerce 
& Insurance 
No No 
Advisory Committee 
for Acupuncture 
§ 63-6-1001 
et seq. 
Yes Governor Yes No 
Board of Athletic 
Trainers 
§ 63-24-101 
et seq. 
Yes Governor Yes No 
Board of Alcohol 
and Drug Abuse 
Counselors 
§ 68-24-601 
et seq. 
Yes Governor Yes No 
Board of 
Chiropractic 
Examiners 
§ 63-4-101 
et seq. 
Yes Governor Yes Yes 
     (continued) 
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Committee for 
Clinical 
Perfusionists 
§ 63-28-101 
et seq. 
Yes Governor Yes Yes 
Board of 
Communications 
Disorders and 
Sciences 
§ 63-17-101 
et seq. 
Yes Governor Yes Yes 
Board of Dentistry 
§ 63-5-101 
et seq. 
Yes Governor Yes Yes 
Board of 
Dietitian/Nutritionis
t Examiners 
§ 63-25-101 
et seq. 
Yes Governor Yes No 
Board of Dispensing 
Opticians 
§ 63-14-101 
et seq. 
Yes Governor Yes Yes 
Emergency Medical 
Services Board 
§ 68-140-301 
et seq. 
No Governor Yes Yes 
Council for 
Licensing Hearing 
Instrument 
Specialists 
§ 63-17-201 
et seq. 
Yes Governor Yes Yes 
Massage Licensure 
Board 
§ 63-18-101 
et seq. 
Yes Governor Yes No 
Board of Medical 
Examiners 
§ 63-6-101 
et seq. 
Yes Governor Yes Yes 
Medical Laboratory 
Board 
§ 68-29-101 
et seq. 
Yes Governor Yes Yes 
Board of Nursing 
§ 63-7-201 
et seq. 
Yes Governor Yes Yes 
Board of Examiners 
for Nursing Home 
Administrators 
§ 63-16-101 
et seq. 
No Governor Yes No 
Board of 
Occupational 
Therapy 
§ 63-13-201 
et seq. 
Yes Governor Yes Yes 
Board of Optometry 
§ 63-8-101 
et seq. 
Yes Governor Yes Yes 
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Board of 
Osteopathic 
Examination 
§ 63-9-101 
et seq. 
Yes Governor Yes Yes 
Board of Pharmacy 
§ 63-10-301 
et seq. 
Yes Governor Yes Yes 
Board of Physical 
Therapy 
§ 63-13-301 
et seq. 
Yes Governor Yes Yes 
Committee on 
Physician Assistants 
(under authority of 
Board of Medical 
Examiners)  
§ 63-19-101 
et seq. 
Yes Governor Yes No 
Board of Podiatric 
Medical Examiners 
§ 63-3-101 
et seq. 
Yes Governor Yes Yes 
Polysomnography 
Professional 
Standards 
Committee (under 
authority of Board of 
Medical Examiners) 
§ 63-31-101 
et seq. 
Yes Governor Yes Yes 
Board for 
Professional 
Counselors, 
Licensed Marital 
and Family 
Therapists, and 
Licensed Clinical 
Pastoral Therapists 
§ 63-22-101 
et seq. 
Yes Governor Yes Yes 
Board of Examiners 
in Psychology 
§ 63-11-101 
et seq. 
Yes Governor Yes Yes 
Board of Respiratory 
Care 
§ 63-27-101 
et seq. 
Yes Governor Yes Yes 
Board of Social 
Worker Licensure 
§ 63-23-101 
et seq. 
Yes Governor Yes No 
Board of Veterinary 
Medical Examiners 
§ 63-12-101 
et seq. 
Yes Governor Yes Yes 
Total Boards: 46 93% 93% 76% 
